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United States Supreme Court 1977-1978 Term:
Criminal Law Decisions
B. J George, Jr. *
The Supreme Court last Term issued several interesting and
highly controversial decisions relating to criminal law and procedure. The Court directed much of its attention to three areas:
investigative activities under the fourth amendment, administration of the double jeopardy clause, and the scope of the Federal
Civil Rights Act. In retrospect, however, there has been no massive restructuring of fundamental constitutional doctrine. The
outlines of protection afforded by certain constitutional guarantees have been somewhat clarified and, particularly in several
search and seizure cases, efforts by some states to exploit recent
so-called law and order decisions have been firmly squelched.
In some contexts, notably the capital penalty decisions and
the Court's ruling on press access to jails, the absence of a solid
majority of the Justices supporting any one doctrine gives little
guidance in the resolution of important cognate questions. This
may reflect the want of a doctrinaire majority (which cannot be
altered short of changes in the Court's personnel) or perhaps a
tacit acceptance of the premise that sweeping statements of constitutional theory should be left to academicians. In any event,
the Term saw many fascinating criminal cases disposed of in
highly intriguing fashion. This Article surveys and synthesizes
the Court's grappling in the criminal law area. For convenience,
the discussion has two major divisions: the first dealing with
procedure from investigation through posttrial processing; the
second with substantive criminal law.

A. Investigation
1.

Search warrants

States have been about evenly divided on the question of
whether the veracity of affidavits tendered in support of a search
warrant application can be impeached after execution of the warrant in an effort to invalidate it. In Franks u. Delaware,' the
* President, Southwestern Legal Foundation, Richardson, Texas
1. 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978).

498

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1978:

Supreme Court aligned itself on the side of impeachability. In an
effort to void a search warrant which had resulted in seizure of
evidence that was possibly crucial in later jury deliberations the
defense brought forward two informants named in the search warrant application who were prepared to testify that the officers had
significantly distorted their statements. Defense counsel averred
that misstatements in the affidavit were not inadvertent, but
rather were submitted in bad faith. The state courts ruled that
the credibility of search warrant affidavits could not be attacked
after a warrant had been issued; rather, an issuing magistrate was
to be the sole arbiter of credibility. The Supreme Court disagreed.
The Court outlined procedure whereby the defense can overcome the presumption of judicial regularity that extends to
search warrant affidavits. First, a defendant must allege deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for truth on the part of an
affiant officer. Assertions of negligence or innocent mistake are
insufficient, and the requisite deliberate or reckless falsehood
must be that of the affiant, not a third-party nongovernmental
informant. Second, an offer of proof must be tendered in support
of a suppression motion. Conclusory terms are insufficient, as is
a mere desire on the part of the defense to cross-examine the
source of information in an affidavit. Allegations must identify
specifically the aspect of an affidavit claimed to be false, and
must be documented by a statement of supporting reasons. Affidavits, sworn statements, or otherwise reliable declarations of
witnesses must be appended, or their absence suitably explained.
If the defense meets these pleading and proof requirements,
the Court held that a fullblown hearing must be held on the
matter. If at that hearing the defense establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that perjury or reckless disregard for truth
has tainted one or more affidavits, then the court must determine
whether, after the data in the false affidavits are set aside, enough
other valid material remains to justify issuance of the warrant. If
it does, the warrant is valid. If it does not, the warrant must be
voided and the evidence seized on its authority excluded exactly
as if probable cause were absent on the face of the affidavits.
The majority opinion contains several interesting doctrinal
asides bearing on the state's policy arguments favoring admissibility of the evidence. First, it was argued that invocation of the
exclusionary rule in the context of veracity of search warrant
affidavits would have too little deterrent effect to justify the ex-
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clusion of otherwise valid e ~ i d e n c eThe
. ~ Court, however, felt that
forbidding all impeachment of affidavits would render the constitutional requirement of probable cause essentially a nullity. Even
deliberately false affidavits would be unimpeachable, and ensuing phases of a criminal prosecution are not well designed to
expose intentional falsehoods perpetrated during ex parte warrant proceedings.
Next, the prosecution contended that magistrates themselves are sufficiently independent to protect fourth amendment
rights. The Court disagreed for several reasons. Warrant proceedings are ex parte, and are usually conducted in haste to forestall
destruction or removal of desired evidence; deliberation is only
moderate. Moreover, magistrates rarely have a close enough acquaintance with the case or claimed sources of information to
generate suspicion about the sufficiency or adequacy of affidavits.
In theory, magistrates can conduct fairly vigorous inquiries into
the reliability of supporting data, but in practice they do not. The
Court did not, however, believe that its holding diminished the
importance and solemnity of the warrant issuance process. The
underlying problem is the ex parte nature of the proceeding, not
the integrity or capacity of the magistrate who conducts it. In any
event, because the Court required that misstatements be intentional or based on reckless disregard for the truth,3 magistrates'
determinations will be final in most instances.
The Court also noted that there was no other adequate remedy for official misconduct in making false affidavits. Drawing
, ~ Court stressed the
from its original exclusionary rule h ~ l d i n gthe
unreasonableness of expecting prosecutors to lodge criminal
charges, or supervisory police personnel to initiate disciplinary
proceedings, against officers who deliberately or recklessly falsify
affidavits.
The state also contended that to permit inquiries into the
veracity of search warrant affidavits would confuse the issue of
defendant guilt or innocence with that of whether official misconduct underlay the affidavits. This in turn would affect already
crowded dockets, especially because defense counsel might use
affidavit hearings as a discovery device. Once more, the majority
2. This premise was drawn from the Court's statement in such decisions as Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), and United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
3. The Court did not define recklessness, but presumably one may look to modem
penal code usage, of which the Model Penal Code is the prototype. MODEL
PENALCODE#
2.02(2)(c) (proposed official draft, 1962).
4. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U S . 643 (1961).
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disagreed. Hearings on the issue are not before a jury, and the
Court's requirement of a showing of intentional or reckless misstatement sufficiently protects against use of a suppression hearing for discovery p ~ r p o s e s . ~
Finally, the prosecution asserted that the defense position
would extend the fourth amendment exclusionary rule into an
area in which control of misconduct is difficult because of the
traditional use in affidavits of hearsay statements based on fleeting observations and tips from anonymous, transient sources of
information. The Court also rejected that premise, reasoning that
inquiry into the integrity of affidavits does not differ substantially from the examination of their sufficiency, which has long
been required under the fourth amendment. Moreover, the Court
has not yet withdrawn from its position that the exclusionary rule
can always be used to reach "substantial and deliberate" official
misconduct.6
It is difficult to fault the Franks decision on theoretical
grounds or to disagree with the majority conclusion that a nonimpeachment rule would leave official perjury unchecked. The
Court's desire to limit the number of cases in which impeachment
can be attempted is evident in its delineation of the procedures
to be followed and in the clear placement of the burden of persuasion on the defense. Despite those limits, however, the judicial
system must now contend with what the dissenters denominate
the "natural tendency of ingenious lawyers charged with representing their client's cause to ceaselessly undermine the limitations which the Court has placed on impeachment of the affidavits offered in support of a search warrant."'
2. Search incident to arrest

Supreme Court decisions that law enforcement officials find
burdensome are sometimes the product of relentlessly pursuing
cases that ought to have been written off by prosecuting authorities at a much earlier stage.8Hardnosed cases make bad law for
5. The Court left open, however, the issue whether an underlying informer's identity
must be revealed once a preliminary showing has been made that an affidavit containing
information allegedly so derived is false. 98 S. Ct. at 2684. That question is not necessarily
governed by the Court's earlier holding that informer identity need not routinely be
disclosed during suppression or other pretrial proceedings. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S.
300 (1967).
6. 98 S. Ct. at 2684.
7. Id. at 2692 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
8. E.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (interrogationof counseled defendant
in the face of specific commitments to counsel not to interrogate); Brown v. Illinois, 422
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prosecutors. An example in the last Term is Mincey v. Arizona.'
During a narcotics arrest precipitating a volley of gunfire, an
officer was killed and Mincey seriously injured. Officers participating in the raid aided the injured but otherwise left the scene
uninvestigated. Homicide detectives arrived shortly afterward
and remained on the scene four days, searching the premises with
minute care and removing between 200 and 300 pieces of evidence. No search warrant was ever obtained. On the strength of
a "murder scene" exception to the fourth amendment warrant
requirement,%tate courts rejected defense efforts to suppress the
evidence. The Supreme Court reversed.
The Court found that the facts of Mincey fell within none of
the special circumstances which have been held to justify warrantless searches.ll The Court rejected the contention that citizens lose all reasonable expectations of privacy by committing
crimes12 because such reasoning "would impermissibly convict
the suspect even before the evidence against him was gathered."13
The prosecution also asserted that the invasion of privacy occasioned by the initially lawful entry justified additional or continued intrusion in the form of a search. This, the Court believed,
was not so; although arrest brings about reduced personal privacy,14 it does not mean that an arrested person has "a lessened
right of privacy in his entire house."15
The majority opinion then considered the legitimacy of the
"murder scene exception" to the fourth amendment warrant requirement as delineated by the Arizona courts. The Court held
that a limited exception indeed exists: officers may make warrantless entries and searches "when they reasonably believe that
a person within is in need of immediate aid," and when arriving
at a homicide scene "they may make a prompt warrantless search
-

- -

U.S. 590 (1975) (protracted interrogation following unlawful entry and arrest); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (ransacking search after patently unlawful entry into residence).
9. 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978). The interrogation aspect of this case is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 99-103 infra.
10. The "murder scene" exception applied to situations where the circumstances of
a homicide or serious personal injury suggested foul play, and where officers were already
legally on the premises. 98 S. Ct. at 2412.
11. The Court canvassed the authorities. Id. at 2412-13.
12. The same contention had been considered and set aside in the Court's arson
investigation ruling, Michigan v. Tyler, 98 S. Ct. 1942 (1978) (discussed in text accompanying notes 28-37 infra).
13. 98 S. Ct. at 2413.
14. The Court cited decisions regarding searches incident to custodial arrest, United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and deferred booking searches, United States v.
Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974). See also Gustafson v . Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
15. 98 S. Ct. at 2413.
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of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on
that action, "the police may seize any
the premi~es."~Wuring
evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities."17 But the Court refused to characterize a search of the length and intensity manifested in Mincey as
falling within that limited exception.
In essence, the Court rejected the idea that every murder
case justifies an exception to the warrant requirement. Anything
advanced in favor of such an exception could be used to support
investigations of other forcible felonies. The fact that criminal
investigations might be more efficiently conducted under such a
sweeping exception carries no weight; a true emergency justification must be found. On the facts of Mincey there was no exigency
beyond the fact of homicide; there was no indication that evidence would be lost, destroyed, or removed while a search warrant was obtained. "Indeed, the police guard at the apartment
minimized that possibility."18 Fundamentally, the Arizona
"murder scene" exception was not strictly circumscribed. The socalled guidelines which the state courts had developed "confer
unbridled discretion upon the individual officer to interpret such
terms as 'reasonable . . . search,' 'serious personal injury with
likelihood of death where there is reason to suspect foul play,' and
'reasonable period.'"lV In the court's view, these are terms a neutral and detached magistrate, not a police officer, ought to interpret and apply if fourth amendment values are to be safeguarded.
3. Administrative searches

The Court last Term thoroughly explained, but did not substantially revise, the doctrines governing administrative searches
set forth in its earlier jurisprudence." Marshall v. Barlow S, Inc. 21
dealt with the provision of the Federal Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 that allows Department of Labor inspectors
16. Id. at 2414.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2415. The Court had earlier held that packages could be withheld from
postal delivery while a search warrant was obtained. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397
U.S. 249 (1970). Similarly, the Court had indicated that a footlocker containing a controlled substance could be retained in police custody pending application for a search
warrant. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). The quoted Mincey language
assumed a like power to control premises while a warrant is sought.
19. 98 S. Ct. at 2415.
20. The prototype decisions are See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (commercial
premises), and Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (residential property).
21. 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978).
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to enter commercial or industrial premises covered by the statute
during reasonable times.22Barlow refused to allow an OSHA
inspector to enter his plumbing business unless he showed a
search warrant. The official then obtained a federal court order
requiring Barlow to admit him, but Barlow again refused to
admit the inspector and commenced his own action for federal
injunctive relief against warrantless OSHA searches. A threejudge federal court ruled in his favor, and the Supreme Court
affirmed.
The Court held that OSHA inspections constitute no special
exception to the rule that the fourth amendment warrants clause
governs searches of commercial as well as private premises. The
Court had recognized earlier that "pervasively regulated" enterprises are subject to warrantless inspections conducted during
, ~ ~industries
working hours standard for the class of e n t e r p r i ~ ebut
and businesses falling within OSHA legislation do not thereby
become pervasively regulated enterprise^.^^ Nor did the Court's
rulings allowing solicitation of union membership on employer
premisesz justify the government's warrantless search since in
those cases the employer had voluntarily opened its premises to
employees who had statutory organizational rights.
Essentially, the Court disbelieved the government contention that OSHA administative procedures provided as much protection of individual privacy as a search or inspection warrant. In
the Court's view, ex parte warrant proceedings safeguard against
the possibility of altered circumstances in premises to be inspected to the same extent agency administrative authorization
might. The Court was also unconcerned over additional strain a
warrant requirement might impose on the agency and on federal
courts. Most business owners will consent to inspection, the Court
assumed, and delay will not be excessive in the instances in which
they do not.
The majority opinion then turned to the requisites for an
administrative inspection order. Such an order does not require
a probable cause showing that an OSHA violation exists; the
criminal prosecution standard does not govern.
22. 29 U.S.C. fi 657(a) (1976).
23. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (firearms dealer); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor business).
24. The Court had taken a similar position during the preceding Term when the
government argued that taxpayer premises were subject to warrantless entries by IRS
officials. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
25. E.g., Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 98 S . Ct. 2463 (1978); NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
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A warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for
an OSHA search on the basis of a general administrative plan
for the enforcement of the Act derived from neutral sources such
as, for example, dispersion of employees in various types of industries across a given area, and the desired frequency of
searches in any of the lesser divisions of the area, would protect
an employer's Fourth Amendment rights.26

The protections given to employers' privacy, in the Court's
view, are not marginal. A warrant gives "assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral rite ria."^' A warrant also
sets limits on the scope and objectives of a search, compliance
with which can be observed and enforced. Hence, the Court held
the injunction against OSHA search practices was properly issued. Barlow's, Inc. did not determine whether other forms of
federal regulatory inspections are under precisely the same controls. One may assume, however, that the fourth amendment
principles discussed in Barlow's, Inc. will govern inspection practice under other federal and state regulatory legislation as well,
notwithstanding the Court's disclaimer.
Some administrative inspections are close to the borderline
between civil and criminal law enforcement. In Michigan v.
Tyler," the Court decisively dealt with the form of investigation
that has caused the greatest amount of litigation in recent years:
arson investigations. While fire personnel were extinguishing a
nighttime blaze on Tyler's premises, they discovered and seized
evidence of arson. After daybreak, arson investigators returned to
the location and found other evidence of arson that had not been
visible a t night; this, too, they appropriated. About three weeks
later, state police fire marshals came back once again and discovered additional evidence. None of the entries and seizures had
been given advance judicial authorization. The state supreme
court ruled that a search warrant was required for any entry onto
premises and for any seizure or evidence once a fire actually had
been extinguished. The Supreme Court agreed with much, but
not all, of the state court analysis.
The Court's administrative search cases, including Barlow 's,
Inc., establish the principle that the fourth amendment safeguards citizens against arbitrary invasions by government offi26. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. at 1825.
27. Id. at 1826.
28. 98 S. Ct. 1942 (1978).
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cials, including fire inspectors, irrespective of whether an entry
is intended to locate and abate a public nuisance or to perform a
routine periodic inspection. The state argued, however, that an
occupant who sets fire to his or her premises has no reasonable
expectation of privacy, while an occupant who is a victim of arson
will not object to official entries. The first premises, left open in
Tyler, was later rejected in Mincey o. ArizonaB under analogous
circumstances. The Court in Tyler reasoned that even if the concept of abandonment of privacy through criminal activity were
theoretically correct, it would be of no help when arson has not
been established at the time of official entry. The second premise was also rejected in Tyler: victims indeed have reasonable
expectations of privacy in fie-ravaged premises that forestall
warrantless, nonconsensual entries, for on occasion they continue
to live or work there, and often have personal property that can
be salvaged.
Consequently, the Court reasoned, searches by firefighters
and arson investigators are within the coverage of the fourth
amendment; there is no basis to differentiate their activities from
those of others engaged in administrative inspections. Moreover,
the Court rejected the argument that a warrant requirement
would be meaningless because nothing need be shown in support
of a warrant application beyond the fact that a fire had occurred.
To secure a warrant to investigate the cause of a fire, an official
must show more than the bare fact that a fire has occurred. The
magistrate's duty is to assure that the proposed search will be
reasonable, a determination that requires inquiry into the need
for the intrusion on the one hand, and the threat of disruption
to the occupant on the other. . . . The number of prior entries,
the scope of the search, the time of day when it is proposed to
be made, the lapse of time since the fire, the continued use of
the building, and the owner's efforts to secure it against intruders might all be relevant facto~-s.30

A magistrate "can perform the important function of preventing
harassment by keeping that invasion to a minimum,"31 and a
warrant serves to reassure property owners of the legality of an
entry.
Evidence discovered in the course of fighting a fire may, the
Court assured, be used to support the issuance of a search or
inspection warrant. A burning building clearly presents an exi-

-

--

29. 98 S.Ct. 2408 (1978) (discussed in text accompanying notes 8-19 supra).
30. 98 S. Ct. at 1949.
31. Id.
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gency rendering an entry reasonable in fourth amendment terms;
"it would defy reason to suppose that firemen must secure a
warrant or consent before entering a burning structure to put out
the blaze."32 Once lawfully on the premises, firemen may seize
evidence in plain view. The Court disagreed, however, with the
state court position that the need for a warrant arises "with the
dousing of the last flame? Fire officials are under a duty to find
the causes of fire, to prevent recurrences, to identify dangerous
conditions, and to preserve evidence from intentional or accidental destruction. The sooner they discharge these duties, the less
will be their later interference with privacy and recovery efforts.
"For these reasons," the Court announced, "officials need no warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable time to investigate
the cause of a blaze after it has been exting~ished,"~~
although the
nature of the premises and the conflagration governs reasonableness .35
Similarly, the Court found no objection under the circumstances to the fire officials' return a few hours later during daylight, since they could have remained constantly on the premises
until that hour. It would have been but an idle formality to require a warrant for such a return. Consequently, the inspection
and seizure of evidence on the morning after the fire were constitutional. All later entries, however, required a warrant.
In effect, Tyler delineated a spectrum of investigative powers. Fire prevention activities seem to be within the scope of
routine regulatory inspections governed by Barlow's, Inc.; these
Firefighters and
can no doubt be handled prograrnmati~ally.~~
investigators may enter premises without obtaining either a warrant or consent during a fire; and once there, they may remain
in, or return to, the premises for a reasonable time to investigate
the cause of a fire. After that period expires, entries for further
investigation must be pursuant to an investigative order or warrant authorizing administrative inspection. If evidence is discovered during either phase, it may be seized and is admissible under
the plain view doctrine. If by the time judicial authorization is
sought, however, investigative personnel have probable cause to
32. Id. at 1950.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1950 n.6.
36. Compare the Tyler quotation at note 30 supra, with that from Barlow's, Inc. at
note 26 supra.
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believe arson has occurred, then the standards to be applied are
those governing search warrants in criminal cases.37
4. Process against third parties

The position of the Court is clear that third parties must
comply with lawfully issued process, even though innocent of
criminal activity. In the controversial decision of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,38the Court rejected lower federal court endeavors to
create hierarchies of process under the fourth amendment.
Zurcher arose from the aftermath of a student demonstration
during which several police officers were injured. There were indications student newspaper photographers had taken pictures that
might identify the assailants; one photograph taken on the occasion already had been published. Accordingly, the district attorney's office sought a search warrant to be executed in the offices
of the newspaper, specifying negatives, films, and pictures showing the identified event. There was no allegation that any newspaper staff member was involved in the unlawful acts. The warrant was executed, and nothing in the ensuing testimony showed
that officers read documents or searched other than for the specified material; the officers left without taking anything.
Thereafter, newspaper staff members filed a Federal Civil
Rights Act suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
the state officials responsible for the search. The federal district
court granted declaratory relief. It held that a search warrant
should not issue under the fourth amendment against one not
suspected of criminal activity unless probable cause exists to believe that the use of a subpoena duces tecum would be impracticable. Moreover, it held that if the innocent object of a search were
a newspaper, a search would be allowable under the first amendment only on a clear showing that important material would be
destroyed or taken from the jurisdiction and that a restraining
order would be futile to prevent it. The federal court of appeals
affirmed per curiam. The Supreme Court reversed.
To the Court majority, nothing on the face or in the history
of the fourth amendment supported the lower courts' sweeping
revision of practice under its terms. Since the amendment is concerned only with where and for what purpose search warrants
may issue, not with the character of persons subjected to service,
process clearly may issue against a third party. Culpability of an
-

37. 98 S. Ct. at 1951.
38. 98 S. Ct. 1970 (1978).

--
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owner or possessor of property to be searched for or seized is not
a condition to issuance of a warrant. To illustrate the principle,
the Court noted its contraband vehicle search doctrine,39which
requires no preliminary arrest. Administrative searches and
inspections also require no advance showing of ~ r i m i n a l i t yRule
.~~
41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure makes no reference
to arrest as a condition to execution of an otherwise properly
issued search warrant. In short, there is nothing "in the Fourth
Amendment indicating that absent probable cause to arrest a
third party, resort must be had to a ~ u b p o e n a . "Searches
~~
and
seizures are independent of, not ancillary to, arrest and the procedures which follow.
History aside, the majority Justices found unpersuasive the
reasons advanced by the district court to support its reconstruction of the fourth amendment. One who knows culpable evidence
is secreted on his or her property and continues to hold it is
culpable enough for purposes of a search warrant. Even absent
that knowledge, service of a search warrant is sufficient in itself
to create awareness of the fact, or to demonstrate a likelihood of
the fact, that evidence has been secreted. When such an awareness exists, the Court reasoned, there is no basis to allow resistance to execution of a search warrant on the ground that a subpoena duces tecum could have been used instead.
Moreover, even assuming the use of a subpoena protects the
personal privacy of third parties to some extent, that does not
justify the risk that evidence will be recovered by its owner or
otherwise lost or destroyed. Good faith on the part of a third party
(who may or may not in fact be innocent of criminal wrongdoing)
does not lessen the risk that evidence will be lost. Thus, nothing
but the district court's unsubstantiated assumptions supported a
change in tradition. Finally, in the Court's analysis, a search
warrant affords more protection to individual privacy than does
a subpoena because the latter issues with no supporting data and
without a judicial order while relatively concrete information
must support a search warrant application.
The Court also rejected the proposition that newspaper or
other media premises are governed by a special standard. The
lower courts had built a special rule on several first-amendmentrelated concerns: (1)searches are sufficiently disruptive to inter39. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
40. See, e.g., statements of the Court quoted at notes 26, 30 supra.
41. 98 S. Ct. at 1978.
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fere with timely publication; (2) confidential sources of information will dry up and press investigations taper off when sources
fear that media files will be available for official inspection; (3)
reporters will not record or preserve their recollections if later
inspection is possible; (4) editorial processes will be impeded by
a fear of disclosure of internal deliberations; and (5) the media
will resort to self-censorshipto conceal the possession of information of possible interest to the police. The majority opinion, however, noted that magistrates can, by applying traditional fourth
amendment requirements, control the issuance and the scope of
warrants to prevent the consequences feared by the newspapers.
In Zurcher itself the limits were precise and were observed by the
police. The paucity of federal search warrants issued against the
media suggested to the Court a present lack of abuse;42if abuse
should appear, however, the majority concluded that the courts
would be competent to deal with it at that time.
Finally, the Court disagreed with the newspaper's contention
that issuance of search warrants for evidence to be used in a
criminal trial works a prohibited prior restraint. No such effect
occurred or was threatened on the facts of Zurcher. Accordingly,
the Court declined to approve any doctrinal system that would
require the use of subpoenas as a general rule if evidence is held
by the media or that would demand notice and a hearing before
search warrants could issue.
A like philosophy informs the Court's decision in United
States v. LaSalle National Bank43that third parties cannot resist
IRS civil process that may turn up evidence supporting either
.civil or criminal tax fraud liability. In LaSalle Bank, an IRS
agent conducted a fraud investigation which supported a suspicion that criminal conduct was present, but the case had not yet
been submitted to the Department of Justice with a request for
prosecution. An IRS summons covering some of the taxpayer's
records under investigation issued against the bank, which resisted on advice of counsel. During subsequent district court proceedings to enforce the summons, the bank and the taxpayer
asserted that the IRS agent had admitted the summons was
strictly related to criminal investigation, so that no civil investigatory purpose underlay it. On that basis the district court refused to compel compliance with the summons. The court of appeals affirmed, but found that the district court had reached a
42. Id. at 1982.
43. 98 S. Ct. 2357 (1978).
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factual determination, not a legal conclusion, in deciding that the
process was for a criminal investigatory purpose, so that review
was limited to application of a clearly erroneous legal standard.
The Supreme Court reversed.
The 1978 decision elaborates on an earlier holding44where the
Court rejected a contention that an IRS summons was unlawful
because a criminal prosecution might have ensued, on the basis
that Congress had authorized the use of such process to investigate potentially criminal conduct. Under the LaSalle Bank facts,
there was a clear possibility of criminal penalties, but the agency
could have opted to pursue civil fraud penalties as well. The
Court noted that "Congress has created a law enforcement system in which criminal and civil elements are inherently intertwined."45Therefore, IRS summonses may be used in connection
with either form of investigation regardless of the particular
agent's subjective intent. The Court held, however, that after a
recommendation of criminal prosecution to the Department of
Justice (when there begins an identifiable separation, although
not a complete divorce, between criminal and civil proceedings),
it would be improper to use IRS summons machinery to secure
evidence useful in prosecution since that would essentially convert the administrative system into a form of criminal discovery.
Moreover, until that moment, IRS authority must be exercised
in good faith; a recommendation of prosecution cannot be delayed for the purpose of gathering evidence to be used by the
government prosecutor. The motivation of a particular IRS intelligence agent does not control, however, because of the administrative review required by IRS regulations before a recommendation of prosecution can be transmitted. Neither the intelligence
agent's entry into the investigation nor his or her subjective intent signals that there has been abuse.
As a result, the question whether an investigation has solely
criminal purposes must be answered only by an examination of
the institutional posture of the IRS . . . . [Tlhis means that
those opposing enforcement of a summons do bear the burden
to disprove the actual existence of a valid civil tax determination or collection purpose by the Service . . . .
Without doubt, this burden is a heavy

But such an inquiry can and should be made because the Court
44. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
45. 98 S. Ct. at 2363.
46. Id. at 2367.
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will "not countenance delay in submitting a recommendation to
the Justice Department when there is an institutional commitment to make the referral and the Service merely would like to
gather additional evidence for the prose~ution."~~
On the LaSalle
Bank record, there had been no recommendation and no showing
of delay for the purpose of gathering criminal evidence; therefore,
the Court held, the district court should have enforced the summons.
As in Franks v. Dela~are,'~
the dissent was most concerned
over the procedural implications of the majority ruling. In the
dissenting Justices' thinking, it would have been sufficient to rest
with the question of whether a referral to the Department of
Justice had occurred by the time process issued. The dissenters
feared that the Court had opened up "endless discovery proceedings and ultimate frustration of the fair administration" of the
tax laws.49
In addition to Zurcher and LaSalle Bank, a third conceptually related holding is found in the United States v. New York
Telephone Co.50 decision that telephone communication carriers
can be required by court order to aid in the installation of pen
register^.^' The Court concluded that pen register devices are not
within the coverage of the federal eavesdropping statute,52that
under the fourth amendment a search warrant may issue authorizing the installation of such a device, and that under the socalled All Writs
a court can issue to federal law enforcement
agents any order necessary to effectuate the issuance of a search
warrant. Absolute necessity is not a prerequisite, the Court reasoned, but simply the fact that an order is "appropriate to effectuate and prevent the frustration of orders . . . previously issued
in [a court's] exercise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained?' Judicial power may be exercised against persons who are not parties
to litigation or not otherwise engaged in wrongdoing if they can
47. Id. a t 2367-68.
48. 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978) (discussed in text accompanying notes 1-7 supra); see text
accompanying note 7 supra.
49. 98 S. Ct. a t 2369 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
50. 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
51. In the words of the Court, "A pen register is a mechanical device that records the
numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electric impulses caused when the dial
on the telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not
indicate whether calls are actually completed." Id. a t 161 n.1.
52. 18 U.S.C. 5 2518(1) (1976) (discussed further in text accompanying notes 59-64
infra).
53. 28 U.S.C. (j 1651(a) (1976).
54. 434 U.S. a t 172.
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frustrate the implementation of a court order. Under the circumstances, the telephone company had few equities, since without
the meager use of its resources required under the district court
order the purpose of the warrant would have been entirely frustrated. The company, as a "highly regulated public utility with
a duty to serve the
had, in the Court's view, no substantial interest in not providing assistance. Moreover, the company
admitted that it regularly used the same kind of device to check
on billing operations and detect fraud, and indeed had offered to
supply the FBI with sufficient information to allow the Bureau
to install its own pen registers. The company was to be reimbursed at standard rates, so that it would sustain no economic
loss. Finally, since Congress has authorized orders directed to a
communications common carrier to furnish facilities for an interc e p t i ~ nthe
, ~ ~company could hardly resist a like order under the
All Writs Act which would accomplish a far lesser invasion of
privacy. To prohibit the district court order, the Court reasoned,
would frustrate a ciear indication by Congress that pen registers
are lawful and would enable a public utility to prevent successful
detection and conviction of those who use its facilities unlawfully.
Against the background of the Court's earlier rulings that
holders of documents cannot resist warrants, subpoenas, or summonses on third-party privilege ground^,^ Zurcher, LaSalle
Bank, and New York Telephone Co. make it clear that those on
whom judicial process is served have only the most narrow basiss8
on which to justify noncompliance. If this phalanx of rulings is
to be broken, it will have to be through legislative amendments
or the construction of a more beneficient rule for defendants
under state law.
5. Electronic surveillance

As indicated above, the Court ruled in United States v . New
York Telephone CO.~'that pen registers are not within the coverage of federal eavesdropping law. This was clear, in the Court's
view, from the preenactment history60as well as the language of
55. Id. at 174.
56. 18 U.S.C. Ej 2518(4) (1976).
57. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391
(1976); see George, United States Supreme Court Term 1975-76: Criminal Law Decisions,
23 WAYNE
L. REV.1, 12-17 (1976).
58. Essentially, the only available challenge is to the regularity of the process on its
face.
59. 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
60. See id. at 167-68.
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the statute itself. Pen registers do not intercept, because they
neither capture the contents of a communication nor determine
that a call has been completed; they merely record the fact of
dialing and the number dialed. They do not achieve "aural acquisition"" of anything, since they merely detect changes in
electrical current created by dialing or pressing telephone buttons. Any challenge, therefore, to the use of pen registers must
come directly under the fourth amendment. Federill Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41(b) in its enumeration of possible objects
of warrant issuancea does not, the Court said, exhaust all possibilities. The Court's decision in KatzU that telephone conversations are within the ambit of the fourth amendment confirmed
that Rule 41 can extend to "seizures of intangible items such as
dial impulses recorded by pen registers as well as tangible
items."64
In Scott u. United States,65the Court dealt with a somewhat
more recondite, although hardly unimportant, aspect of federal
eavesdropping legislation, namely the minimization requirement." A federal district court suppressed all wiretap and derivative evidence relating to a narcotics conspiracy because the
agents failed to minimize interference with noncriminal communications, as evidenced by the fact that almost all calls were
intercepted while only forty percent were actually narcotics related. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the district court
should not have used a percentage test to ascertain minimization;
instead, the agents' efforts to minimize under the particular circumstances were the key to whether their conduct was reasonable. On remand, the district court again suppressed the evidence
because it found the agents had not sufficiently endeavored to
minimize. Once more the court of appeals reversed. The defendant was convicted at the trial which followed, and the appellate
court and the Supreme Court affirmed.
The defendant argued that a finding of a good faith effort to
comply with warrant requirements is essential to a holding of
61. Interception under the federal statute is defined as "the aural acquisition of the
contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical,
or other device." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1976).
62. The rule covers "(1) property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a
criminal offense; (2) contraband, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed; [and] (3) property designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as
the means of committing a criminal offense." FED.R. CRIM.P. 41(b).
63. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
64. 434 U.S. at 170.
65. 98 S. Ct. 1717 (1978).
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976).
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actual compliance, so that a failure to make good faith attempts
at minimizing interference violates an underlying judicial order
authorizing eavesdropping. The Court, however, endorsed the
government analysis that a finding of noncompliance must be
made in light of objective circumstances; subjective intent is significant only in determining whether the exclusionary rule is to
be invoked after a violation has been established. Thus, in Terry
v. Ohiom the key issue was whether, by an external standard, the
frisk was reasonable. Similarly in United States v. Robinson," as
long as the search incident to custodial arrest was objectively
justifiable, it did not matter that the searching officer's state of
mind did not correspond to the abstract assumption underlying
the rule (that is, that the arrestee might be armed and dangerous,
or in possession of evidence of crime). The Court reasoned that
the minimization requirement does not require a different result.
Congressional use of the word "conducted" in the statutea9"made
it clear that the focus was to be on the agents' actions not their
motives."70
On the Scott facts, the trial court's use of a percentage test
to determine minimization was improper. Some calls were very
brief, and others were from persons not earlier identified to be
innocent callers. The tapped telephones also were in a private
apartment believed to be the hub of a narcotics network; they
were not public telephones from which only occasional unlawful
transactions might be conducted. Furthermore, the Court noted
that the time during the course of interception a t which a call is
recorded is significant; at an early stage all calls may need to be
intercepted to establish "categories of nonpertinent calls which
will not be intercepted thereafter. On balance, the majority
found no basis upon which to overturn the court of appeals' determination from the trial court record that the minimization requirement had been met.
6. Stop-and-frisk

In Pennsylvania v. Mirnrn~,'~
the only stop-and-frisk decision
of the Term, the Supreme Court overturned a state supreme court
67. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (leading stop-and-frisk decision).
68. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
69. 18 U.S.C. Q 2518(5) (1976). The statute requires that any interception "be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise
subject to interception." Id.
70. Scott v. United States, 98 S. Ct. at 1724.
71. Id. at 1725.
72. 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam, with three Justices dissenting).
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ruling that officers violated the fourth amendment when they
ordered vehicle occupants to alight after valid traffic arrests.
After Mimms had left his vehicle, officers observed a suspicious
bulge which, on further investigation, proved to be an unlawfully
possessed handgun. Mimms was prosecuted and convicted of
carrying a concealed weapon. The state supreme court reversed
the conviction under the derivative evidence rule because the
officer did not have probable cause to order Mimms from the
automobile. All observations and the physical search, in the state
court's view, were tainted by the unlawful order. The Supreme
Court reversed.
Reasonableness, the Court observed, always involves a balance between public interest and individual personal security.
There was nothing improper in the inception of the transaction,
the Court reasoned, for the officers had observed a clear criminal
violation in their presence. Even though nothing suggested that
Mimms himself posed an apparent danger to officers, it was not
an unreasonable practice to order all drivers thus stopped from
their vehicles, since that would render them fully visible and help
forestall assaults on officers. The Court felt that although not all
assaults on officers approaching vehicles occur in connection with
traffic arrests, enough do occur to render the practice in such a
setting reasonable. The majority also noted that there is physical
danger to officers if they are required to stand a t or near the
driver's side of vehicles where traffic may be passing, a danger
that can be obviated by requiring drivers to move to the shoulder
of a road. In contrast to this enhancement of officers' safety, the
Court found the inconvenience to drivers to be minimal, and thus
suitably ignored by legal doctrine. The Court concluded that
"[wlhat is at most a mere inconvenience cannot prevail when
balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer's safety."73
7. The fourth amendment exclusionary rule

Mention has already been made about the Court's asides on
the exclusionary rule: for example, that it extends to "substantial
and deliberate" violation^;^^ and that officers' subjective states of
mind are not to control in determining whether an IRS summons
properly issued75or whether minimization has occurred during
73. Id. at 111.
74. Franks v. Delaware, 98 S . Ct. 2674, 2684 (1978).
75. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 98 S. Ct. 2357 (1978) (discussed in text
accompanying notes 43-49 supra).
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eavesdr~pping,~"ut only in deciding whether the exclusionary
rule should be invoked after a violation has been established
under objective criteria. The Court, however, dealt directly with
one aspect of the rule-its applicability to witnesses whose identity is discovered through an unreasonable search or seizure.
In United States v. C e c ~ o l i n ia, ~local
~ police officer, during
a social visit to a clerk in defendant's shop, casually looked in an
envelope beside the cash register and discovered gambling memoranda. He asked the clerk its source and was informed that defendant had left it to be delivered to a named person. Afterward, the
officer's discovery was reported to an FBI agent without full mention of the circumstances of that discovery. Four months later,
the FBI agent interviewed the clerk at her home and obtained an
offer from her to cooperate with investigating officers. The defendant thereafter gave sworn testimony before a federal grand jury
that he had never taken policy bets in his shop. In an ensuing
perjury prosecution the clerk was called as a principal government witness. The district court found, on the strength of the
clerk's testimony, that perjury had been committed, but subsequently granted a defense motion to suppress the testimony and
set aside the guilty verdict. The government appealed unsuccessfully to the court of appeals, which affirmed because the causal
connection between the unlawful search and the witness' testimony was "both straight and uninterr~pted,"~~
with no indication
that discovery of her identity was inevitable. The Supreme Court
reversed.
The majority Justices agreed, contrary to the government's
assertion, that the Wong S u n testTgapplies to live witnesses. However, the statement in Wong S u n that there is no difference between physical and verbal evidenceR0
has been substantially qualified by later decisions of the Court. Wong S u n involved a putative defendant, while Ceccolini was concerned with a prosecution
witness. Thus, the court of appeals "was simply wrong in concluding that if the road were uninterrupted, its length was immaterial." Length, the Court held, "is material, as are certain other
76. Scott v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1717 (1978) (discussed in text accompanying
notes 65-71 supra).
77. 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
78. Id. at 273 (quoting 542 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1976)).
79. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U S . 471 (1963). Under Wong Sun, the test is
whether "the connection between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of
the challenged evidence has 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' " Id. at 487
(quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
80. Id. at 486.
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factors . . . to which the court gave insufficient eight."^'
The Court then reviewed its statements as to the limitations
on application of the exclusionary rule in grand jury proceedingsu2
and its use for impeachment purposes,R3reiterating that the rule
does not bar all evidence against all persons.u4Controls on standing to invoke the rule also are relevant." All these principles
supported the Court's conclusion that there is no per se exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment.
Under the Court's analysis, the degree of free will exercised
by a witness is important in determining the extent to which "the
basic purpose of the exclusionary rule will be advanced by its
a p p l i c a t i ~ n . "The
~ ~ greater a witness' willingness to testify, the
greater the likelihood he or she will be discovered by legal means,
and the smaller the incentive to use illegal means. The Court
noted, however, that a contrary analysis might govern if police
had acted unlawfully specifically to discover potential witnes~es.~'
Nevertheless, in most instances, illegality of discovery
may well play no role in a witness' decision to cooperate with the
prosecution.
Moreover, the Court recognized that "[r]ules which disqualify knowledgeable witnesses from testifying a t trial are . . .
'serious obstructions to the ascertainment of tr~th.'"~TJnder
the
standards laid down in Michigan v. Tucker,ugcourts ought not
readily prevent witnesses from testifying; rather, "a closer, more
direct link between the illegality and that kind of testimony is
required."" The Court did not intend to suggest that witness
testimony is better than demonstrative evidence (the converse
may well be true); but "[a]ttenuation analysis, appropriately
concerned with the differences between live-witness testimony
and inanimate evidence, can consistently focus on [the voluntariness and knowledgeability of witnesses] with respect to the former, but on different factors with respect to the latter?'
In so holding, the Court reaffirmed a somewhat hoary state81. 435 U.S. at 275 (emphasis in original).
82. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
83. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
84. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
85. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
86. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276.
87. Id. at 276 n.4.
88. Id. at 277 (quoting C. MCCORMICK,
HANDBOOK
OF THE LAWOF EVIDENCE
$ 71
(1954)).
89. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
90. 435 U.S. at 278.
91. Id. at 278-79.
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ment that "[a] criminal prosecution is more than a game in
which the Government may be checkmated and the game lost
merely because its officers have not played according to rule?"'
Thus, "[tlhe penalties visited upon the Government, and in turn
upon the public, because its officers have violated the law must
bear some relation to the purposes which the law is to serve."93
There was overwhelming evidence in Ceccolini that the witness
exercised free will in deciding to testify and was in no way coerced
to that decision by the local officer's discovery of the policy memoranda: substantial time elapsed between illegal discovery and
an official approach to the witness, FBI agents were already
aware of the clerk's relationship to the defendant, there was no
indication of an improper motive on the h a 1 officer's part in
entering the shop and examining the envelope, and there was no
evidence of an intent to discover the witness. "Application of the
exclusionary rule in this situation could not have the slightest
deterrent effect on the behavior of an officer such as [this]," the
Court reasoned, and the burden of permanently silencing the
witness "is too great for an evenhanded system of law enforcement to bear in order to secure such a speculative and very likely
negligible deterrent effect."g4Thus, the Court majority confirmed
its analytical premise, evident for the past four Terms, that the
exclusionary rule is no longer an automatic or mechanical process, but rather a dynamic one that involves weighing the possible
deterrent impact of excluding evidence against the need of the
judicial system for as broad an array of probative evidence as
possible to support a proper adjudication.
8. Eyewitness identification proceedings

In Moore v. I l l i n ~ i sthe
, ~ ~Court reiterated its doctrine that
identification procedures after commencement of formal proceedings are governed by more protective standards than those for
earlier identification measures. A rape victim, who had had only
a few seconds to view her assailant's face, was taken by an officer
to a courtroom in which the defendant (whose photograph was
one of two or three she had selected) was being preliminarily
examined to determine detention or release pending indictment.
Moore was not represented by counsel a t the time. The victim
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 279 (quoting McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99 (1927)).
Id. at 279.
Id. at 280.
434 U.S. 220 (1977).
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identified Moore as her assailant. After indictment, defense counsel moved to suppress the identification evidence, but the motion
was denied on the basis that there was an independent source for
the identification. An ensuing conviction was affirmed in the
state supreme court. An application for federal habeas corpus
also proved unsuccessful. In reviewing the action, however, the
Supreme Court reversed.
The Court's position in its Wade v. United Statesg6and
Gilbert v. Californiag7decisions is clear: After a criminal case has
been commenced the right to counsel governs every critical stage,
including identification proceedings. In Kirby v. Illin~is,~"he
right to counsel did not attach to an identification proceeding
because judicial criminal proceedings had not been initiated. In
Moore, the Court held that the preliminary hearing marked the
commencement of such proceedings and, therefore, the state's
position that indictment is needed before the Wade-Gilbert rule
governs was erroneous. The fact t h a t the defendants in both
Wade and Gilbert were the subjects of lineup proceedings while
Moore involved a one-on-one confrontation failed to influence the
Court because, if anything, a confrontation poses a greater risk
of misidentification than a lineup.
The Court reasoned that the fact the identification was made
during a judicial proceeding did not lessen the need for counsel.
Thus, sixth amendment considerations under Wade-Gilbert operated fully in Moore's situation. The officer had told the victim she
was to view a suspect, and she had previously had but a brief
opportunity to see her attacker. Counsel might have forestalled
some of this suggestiveness. The Court enumerated the following
actions defense counsel might have taken a t that time: (1) request a continuance until a proper lineup could be conducted; (2)
seek to excuse the victim from the courtroom while evidence bearing on probable cause was received; (3) ask that the defendant
be seated among spectators when the victim attempted an identification; and (4) cross-examine the complainant before her identification hardened. Of course, whether such requests are to be
granted is a matter within trial court discretion, but none is improper per se.
The Court ruled that Moore's sixth amendment rights thus
had been violated. Under the circumstances, the state courts
erred in invoking the independent source test to justify the vic96. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
97. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
98. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
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tim's trial testimony. She testified not merely to the identity of
defendant as her attacker, but also to the fact that she had so
identified him at the preliminary hearing. This, the Court said,
was the direct exploitation of an improper identification proceeding which Gilbert forbids. On remand, the state court was directed to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
9. Interrogation

The search and seizure aspects of Mincey u. Arizonag9have
already been canvassed. The Court also considered a dimension
of confessions law in that case. Mincey was questioned in a hospital intensive care unit. He had tubes in his throat so that all his
responses to questions had to be written. He was in much pain,
under sedation, and apparently slipped into unconsciousness a t
various times while the interrogating officer was present.
Miranda warnings were given, but Mincey repeatedly indicated
that he wanted to speak with an attorney before answering certain questions. The state courts drew upon Harris u. New YorklOO
and Oregon v. Hassl" for the doctrine that statements violating
Miranda rules can be used to impeach. Since they also found the
confession to be voluntary, the state courts concluded that it was
proper to allow the trial jury to hear Mincey's confession after he
had testified in his own behalf. The Supreme Court disagreed.
Any use of an involuntary confession, the Court said, constitutes a per se denial of due process, irrespective of other valid
evidence to support the conviction. Moreover, the Court was not
bound to accept the state court determination that a confession
was voluntary. Under the circumstances in Mincey, "[tlhe
statements at issue were . . . the result of virtually continuous
questioning of a seriously and painfully wounded man on the edge
of consciousness,"~~
not the product of a free and rational choice.
"[Tlhe undisputed evidence makes clear that Mincey wanted
not to answer [the detective]. But Mincey was weakened by pain
and shock, isolated from family, friends and legal counsel, and
barely conscious, and his will was simply overborne."lo3 Hence,
the Court concluded, his statements could not be used even for
purposes of impeachment.
99. 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978) (discussed in text accompanying notes 9-19 supra).
100. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
101. 420 US.714 (1975).
102. Mincey v. Arizona, 98 S. Ct. a t 2418.
103. Id. (emphasis in original).
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B. Pretrial Bocedure
1. Plea negotiations
The stance of the Supreme Court in Bordenkircher v.
Hayes1" is clear: plea bargaining, or negotiating, is a legitimate
process. Hayes was charged with forgery in state court. During
plea negotiations the prosecutor indicated he would recommend
a five-year sentence if Hayes would plea guilty, but that if no
guilty plea were forthcoming on those terms he would seek a
habitual criminal indictment against Hayes. Hayes ultimately
refused to plead guilty and the prosecutor acted as he had said
he would, properly within the terms of the state's recidivism law.
Hayes' conviction and resulting life sentence under the charges
were affirmed in the state appellate court, and a federal district
court denied habeas corpus relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed,
however, on the premise that the prosecutor's conduct violated
the rule of Blackledge v. Perry,lo5which it interpreted to protect
defendants "from the vindictive exercise of a prosecutor's discretion."lo6The Supreme Court reversed.
Hayes was well aware of the prosecutor's intentions before
indictment under the recidivism law; hence, the case involved no
additional charging after the defendant had refused to plead
guilty to a single original charge. The situation was the same, the
Court concluded, as if the habitual offender indictment were already pending and the prosecutor had promised to drop it if
Hayes pleaded. Nevertheless, the court of appeals appeared to
hold that due process is violated if a prosecutor's charging decision is governed by what he or she intends to gain during plea
bargaining. The Supreme Court did not validate such doctrine.
The Court has already indicated that plea negotiation is
important to the orderly functioning of the criminal justice system.lo7For this reason counsel plays a vital role in plea negotiationslO%nd plea agreements will be enforced.logThe court of appeals erred when it held the contents of a plea offer can directly
violate due process. Vindictiveness under North Carolina v.
Pearcell" and Blackledge v. Perry"' has to do with unilateral in104. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
105. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
106. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 44 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Bordenkircher
v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
107. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
108. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970).
109. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
110. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
111. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
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fliction of adverse consequences on defendants who have exercised a right of appeal; it bears no relationship, the Court asserted, to give-and-take negotiations during plea bargaining, in
which no element of punishment or retaliation is present.
The Court recognized that each side has its own interests to
promote in plea negotiations. "Defendants advised by competent
counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent choice in response to prosecutorial persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to false selfcondemnation. " l 2 Thus, to accept legitimate plea bargaining
necessarily is to reject "any notion that a guilty plea is involuntary in a constitutional sense simply because it is the end result
of the bargaining process."l13 Consequently, although confronting
a defendant with the alternative of more severe punishment if
trial is sought may affect a decision to plead, "by tolerating and
encouraging the negotiation of pleas, this Court has necessarily
accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the
prosecutor's interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the
defendant to forgo his right to plead not guilty."l14
In sum, selectivity in law enforcement is not bad as long as
it does not rest on an unjustifiable standard like race or religion.
In the Court's view, to include a desire to induce a guilty plea
within the concept of "unjustifiable standard" would "contradict
the very premises that underlie the concept of plea bargaining
itself. " Woreover, such a holding "could only invite unhealthy
subterfuge that would drive the practice of plea bargaining back
into the shadows from which it has so recently emerged."l16 The
Court recognized the potential for abuse in granting broad prosecutorial discretion, but noted that "there are undoubtedly constitutional limits upon its exercise."l17 Those due process limits were
not, however, transgressed in Hayes' case.
2. Federal jurisdiction

The Court rendered three interesting decisions delineating
the jurisdictional powers of Indian tribes, as well as the reach of
112. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 363.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 364.
115. Id. at 365.
116. Id.
117. Id. This appears to be the first intimation by the Court that prosecutorial discretion can be attacked on due process grounds.
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federal criminal laws in relationship to state legislation. In
United States v. John, l l R the Court ruled that the Major Crimes
Act,l19 which covers certain crimes committed in "Indian country," extends to a part of Mississippi where Choctaw Indians have
lived for more than a century. John was convicted under the Act,
but his federal conviction was reversed on the ground that the
situs was not in Indian country. In the interim, Mississippi convicted John of a crime arising from the same transaction, and the
state supreme court affirmed. The Supreme Court granted review
in both cases. After an exhaustive inquiry into the history of the
federal treatment of the Choctaws, the Court concluded that the
area within the State of Mississippi indeed constituted "Indian
country" within the meaning of the Act. Consequently, the Court
held, the state's criminal jurisdiction was preempted by the federal statute.
The other two decisions dealt with in personam tribal jurisdiction. In the first, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,120 nonIndian defendants charged with criminal and traffic violations on
a tribal reservation sought federal habeas corpus based on the
tribal court's lack of jurisdiction over non-Indians. Relief was
denied. The Supreme Court reversed. It found nothing to indicate
that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians had been reserved
under treaties with any Indian nation, including the Suquamish.
And, since tribal courts were created by congressional action,
they have only the jurisdiction specifically allocated to them,
which does not extend to non-Indians. "By submitting to the
overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of
the United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress."121
Despite the facts that tribal courts have become more sophisticated and federal legislation guarantees defendants before them
a number of basic procedural rights, the Court maintained that
remedies must come from Congress even though crimes by nonIndians on tribal lands pose a real problem. Meanwhile, there is
no tribal jurisdiction over the non-Indian defendant.
The second decision, United States v. Wheeler,122 considered
the correlative issue of criminal jurisdiction over tribal members.
A Navajo Indian was first convicted in tribal courts of contribut118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

98 S: Ct. 2541 (1978).
18 U.S.C. 6 1153 (1976).
435 U.S. 191 (1978).
Id. at 210.
435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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ing to the delinquency of a minor and later prosecuted in federal
district court for statutory rape for the same act. The district
court dismissed the prosecution on double jeopardy grounds, an
action affirmed by the court of appeals because both courts were
entities of the same sovereign. The Supreme Court reversed.
Indian tribes have always had sovereign power over their own
members, and at least a limited sovereignty continues until either
relinquished by treaty or abrogated by act of Congress. Neither
event had occurred in the case of the Navajo Nation. The Court
found no constitutional difficulty in the fact that, under
Oliphant, tribal courts have no jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Jurisdiction over tribal members has continued unabated, and
with good reason, since tribes have a significant interest in maintaining orderly relationships among members and in preserving
tribal customs. Federal preemption, the Court reasoned might
well conflict with needs of tribal self-government. Accordingly,
the concept of dual sovereignty continues to control; double jeopardy does not bar a subsequent federal prosecution.

C. Trial Proceedings
1. Jury trial

A jury cannot constitutionally number fewer than six persons. The Court's judgment to that effect in Ballew v. Georgia123
was unanimous, but there was no majority opinion expressing a
clearly controlling rationale. Justices Blackmun and Stevens
pointed to a number of possible defects suggested by scholarly
research in smaller juries: (1)they impede effective group deliberations; (2) the risk of erroneous convictions increases; (3) variances in results among different juries increase to the detriment
of defendants; and (4) minority juror participation is reduced.
Furthermore, they noted that research methodological problems
may mask other potential disparities between verdicts of large
and small juries. They perceived no differences in these phenomena based on the seriousness of the offense charged, and no remedy in the fact that unanimity of verdict is required. Absent
empirical data to support the validity of five-person jury determinations and appreciable savings in court time, they would allow
no reduction below six persons. Justice White concurred on the
sole ground that juries of five or fewer fail to represent fairly a
community.lu Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
123. 435 US. 223 (1978).
124. Id. at 245 (White, J., concurring).This rationale is presumably derived from the
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Justice Rehnquist, thought that a line had to be drawn somewhere and that six was as good as five, but he disagreed with the
premise that states must follow all aspects of federal practice as
es
Stewart, and
Justice Blackmun a s s ~ m e d . ~ ~ V u s t i cBrennan,
Marshall concurred in the Court's judgment, but would have
barred retrial because of their belief that the Georgia obscenity
statute under which Ballew had been tried was unconstituBecause only three states have allowed criminal
tionally broad.lZR
trial juries smaller than six persons, the impact of the decision is
not great, and the lack of a controlling doctrinal statement of no
particular moment.
2. Double jeopardy

The Term saw significant elaborations upon, and in some
respects changes in the scope of, the double jeopardy rule. In Crist
v. Bretz, the Court held that the Constitution requires jeopardy
to attach in jury cases when a jury is empaneled to begin trial.
Although in federal courts the point a t which jeopardy attaches
differs in bench and jury trials, the state had applied the same
rule to both: jeopardy was deemed to attach when the first witness was sworn. Consequently, it had not barred retrial when,
after the jury was sworn, a mistrial was granted upon motion of
the prosecution to allow a proper information to be filed after
amendment had been disallowed by the trial court. The Supreme
Court thought no such variation from federal practice was constitutionally allowable even though its roots lay in the English common law. The Court found no room for a balancing test turning
on how far trial has advanced, as the federal government had
argued as amicus curiae.128Since the federal doctrine "protects
the defendant's interest in retaining a chosen jury," the Court
reasoned that "the federal rule that jeopardy attaches when the
jury is empaneled and sworn is an integral part of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy."12gThus, defendants
have a right to their original jury unless they waive it.
The Wheeler case130is an exotic invocation of the dual soverconstitutional standard for obscenity upon which the petitioner's conviction depended.
Miller v . California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
125. Id. at 245-46 (Powell, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 246 (Brennan, J., concurring).
127. 98 S. Ct. 2156 (1978).
128. Id. at 2162 n.16.
129. Id. at 2162.
130. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (discussed in text accompanying
note 122 supra).
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eignty concept within double jeopardy, extending the doctrine to
sequential federal and tribal prosecutions. The same approach
applies between the states and the federal government; each sovereign may prosecute an act or transaction which violates its
criminal laws.131 As an administrative matter, however, the Department of Justice has instructed federal prosecutors not to replicate a state prosecution unless there are compelling federal
reasons to do so. The 1977-1978Term saw a more formal endorsement of the so-called Petite policy,ln although not to the extent
of rejecting the fundamental dual sovereignty doctrine.
In Rinaldi u. United States, lS3 the federal prosecutor told the
trial court that he had been instructed to pursue vigorously a
federal prosecution, despite a state conviction already entered in
the same transaction, seemingly for fear that the state conviction
might be overturned in the state appellate courts. On appeal of
the federal conviction, the government acknowledged that the
Petite policy in fact had been ignored and the court of appeals
remanded so that the government might move to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a). On remand the trial
court refused to grant the motion because it came after completion of trial and the prosecutor had shown bad faith in the original prosecution of the case. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc,
affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed.
The Petite policy, the Court reasoned, promotes "efficient
management of limited Executive resources and encourages local
responsibility in law enforcement."134Moreover, the executive
policy underlying the Petite regulation protects interests which
would be of constitutional significance were it not for the dual
sovereignty doctrine.
In the Court's view, the trial court's concern with the prosecution's bad faith was misplaced in the setting of a Rule 48(a)
motion. There was no bad faith a t the time of the motion to
dismiss, even though there might have been when trial was
commenced. The motion to dismiss could not be viewed as
"clearly contrary to manifest public interest."135There was nothing to suggest that the defendant would have been prejudiced by
131. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959).
132. This policy is referred to by the Court as the Petite policy, named after an earlier
decision in which its existence was acknowledged. Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529
(1960).
133. 434 U.S. 22 (1977).
134. Id. at 27.
135. Id. at 30 (quoting United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975)).
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the government's motion as might have occurred, for example, if
the underlying purpose were to harass through charging, dismissing, and recharging.13RSince no proper societal interest would be
served by punishing the defendant a second time, the trial court
abused its discretion when it refused to grant the prosecution's
motion to dismiss.
The constitutional concern over double punishment also
impacts on statutory construction. Even though there may not be
a direct constitutional infringement in treating two offenses arising from the same set of operative facts as different crimes,13'
congressional intent to allow repeated punishment based on a
single occurrence or series of related occurrences must be clear,
the Court said in Simpson v. United States.138Following the canons of statutory construction that ambiguities are to be resolved
in favor of defendants and that special statutes are to be preferred
over general, the Court ruled that the penalties for using firearms
to commit felonies13gand those for committing aggravated bank
robberylMcould not be imposed cumulatively if they are based
upon the same events. Under the circumstances, dual prosecution
seemed to the Court to have violated published Department of
Justice interpretations of these statutes. Even if the government's
position had changed, the original version was consonant with
congressional purpose, the Court wrote, while the new one was
not.
If a trial court acquits a defendant who has been placed in
jeopardy, retrial is barred even if the acquittal was erroneous, and
no casuistical procedural analysis can be invoked to avoid that
result. In Sanabria u. United States, 141 the defendant was charged
in a single-court indictment with having participated in an illegal
gambling business;142a section of state law was incorporated by
reference to define the unlawful enterprise. At the close of the
government's proof, the district court decided that the referenced
state statute governed only horsebetting, not numbers, and on
that basis alone erroneously ruled out evidence that the defendant had engaged in numbers t r a n ~ a c t i 0 n s .The
l ~ ~ court then ac136. Id. at 29 n.15.
137. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
138. 435 U.S. 6 (1978).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1976).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (1976).
141. 98 S. Ct. 2170 (1978).
142. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1976).
143. Another section of the state code, mistakenly omitted from the indictment,
clearly prohibited numbers rackets. That error was subject to correction under Rule 7 of
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quitted Sanabria because the prosecution had failed to prove the
horsebetting charge. The government appealed on the theory that
the trial court disposition amounted to dismissal of an indictment
which came within the prosecutorial appeals statute.ld4The court
of appeals interpreted the trial court action as a holding that
discrete crimes had been charged in the same count, that they
should be severed, and that one of the severed counts should be
dismissed. Hence, the dismissal was not on the merits and prosecution appeal was possible under Dinitz v. United States.ld5The
Supreme Court sharply disagreed with the circuit court analysis.
The constitutional issue arising from prosecutorial appeals is
not the question of appellate powers as such, said the Court, but
rather whether retrial on the merits would be a possibility if the
government were successful on appeal. If that possibility exists,
then double jeopardy bars appeal. The trial court action in
Sanabria was clearly an acquittal on a single charge, not a severance and partial dismissal. The trial court had not found that the
indictment failed to state an offense, as in Lee v. United States;146
instead, it had held the allegations to be too narrow to admit
certain evidence. Under the federal statute, properly interpreted,
there was but one crime and it was independent of the number
of potential state offenses committed at the same time. Indeed,
it would have been improper to divide the charge into separate
counts based on state law categories. Accordingly, the trial court
had acquitted on the merits, barring retrial unless the case fell
within two narrow exceptions: defense resistance to consolidation
of separately charged offenses,ld7or defense delay in raising a
known legal defense until jeopardy attaches in order to forestall
retrial.ld8Sanabria, however, turned on an erroneous ruling on
relevancy of evidence which the prosecution wished to overturn
on appeal. That, the Court held, is exactly the type of prosecution
appeal double jeopardy forbids.
A similar policy underlay the Court's holding in Burks u.
United States14gthat a defendant cannot be retried if the sole
basis for appellate reversal is insufficiency of the evidence to
sustain a conviction. There, the court of appeals had remanded
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, the evidence was admissible on other
grounds. 98 S. Ct. at 2181 n.22.
144. 18 U.S.C. 5 3731 (1976).
145. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
146. 432 U.S. 23 (1977).
147. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
148. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 394 (1975).
149. 98 S. Ct. 2141 (1978).
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the case for the trial court to determine whether an acquittal
should be entered or a new trial ordered. The Supreme Court
ruled that no such option existed. If the district court had acquitted for insufficient evidence, clearly no retrial would have been
possible. However, if a reversal turns even in part on trial error
or other procedural flaw,lJOthen another proceeding free from
error is possible because reversal embodies no conclusion that the
prosecution has failed to prove its case. "When this occurs," the
Court reasoned "the accused has a strong interest in obtaining a
fair readjudication of his guilt free from error, just as society
maintains a valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished."151 When the sole basis of reversal is insufficiency of evidence, however, then the prosecution cannot be given "the proverbial 'second bite at the apple.'"lJ2 Thus, the court of appeals
should have directed entry of a judgment of acquittal in the case.
The Court also held, in Greene v. Massey, lJ3 that Burks is binding
on the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
In Arizona v. WashingtonlJ4the Court dealt definitively with
the matter of retrial after mistrial, a problem that has surfaced
periodically before it.lJ5In opening remarks to the jury, Washington's counsel mentioned alleged prosecution misconduct in an
earlier trial. When the prosecutor requested a mistrial, defense
counsel asked for additional time to find law supporting the propriety of his comments. To save time, two prosecution witnesses
were called to testify. The next day, after defense counsel had
produced no precedent supporting his position, the prosecution
once more urged a mistrial. The trial court, after mentioning its
concern that a mistrial would bar retrial, granted the mistrial
based on defense counsel's comments. After the state appellate
court rejected the defense's interlocutory appeal against the
order, the defendant obtained federal habeas corpus to prevent
retrial. The district court noted in issuing the writ that the state
court judge had made no specific finding of manifest necessity in
granting the mistrial. The federal court of appeals affirmed although, like the district court, it found defense counsel's state150. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) (defective indictment).
151. 98 S. Ct. at 2149.
152. Id. at 2150.
153. 98 S. Ct. 2151 (1978).
154. 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976); United States v. Dinitz,
424 U.S. 600 (1976); Illinois v. Sommerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); United States v. Jorn,
400 U.S. 470 (1971).
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ments to have been legally improper. The Supreme Court reversed.
For the reasons canvassed later in Sanabria and Burks, the
Court recognized that retrial is impossible a t state instance after
either conviction or acquittal. If a proceeding is stopped before
final adjudication, however, the same rule does not necessarily
apply. The "valued right to have the trial concluded by a particular tribunal is sometimes subordinate to the public interest in
affording the prosecutor one full and fair opportunity to present
his evidence to an impartial jury."15s Although the heavy burden
of showing manifest necessity rests on the prosecution to justify
a mistrial, the standard demanded by the Court is not a mechanical one: "there are degrees of necessity and we require a 'high
degree' before concluding that a mistrial is appropriate."15'
The Court identified the easy cases. A mistrial to allow the
prosecution to strengthen its evidence a t retrial is an "abhorrent"
p r a ~ t i c e . ~ ~ ~ ' T hwrote
u s , " the Court, "the strictest scrutiny is
appropriate when the basis for the mistrial is the unavailability
of critical prosecution evidence, or when there is reason to believe
that the prosecutor is using the superior resources of the State to
harass or to achieve a tactical advantage over the accused."159At
the other extreme is the hung jury, where a mistrial and retrial
are appropriatelsOto accord "recognition to society's interest in
giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to convict those
who have violated its laws."lsl
On the spectrum of trial problems, the Court felt that Washington's case fell within the area of justified mistrials. Defense
counsel acted wrongly in pointing out prosecution misconduct in
the earlier trial, because such evidence is not admissible under
Arizona law. While some trial courts might have contented themselves with cautionary instructions rather than mistrials, that did
not mean that the trial judge acted improperly in the instant
litigation. The Court itself in other settings had sustained a trial
court conclusion that a fair trial could not be expected under the
particular circumstance^.^^^ An error in an opening statement can
156. 434 U.S. at 505.
157. Id. at 506.
158. Id. at 507-08.
159. Id.
160. United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976).
161. 434 U.S. at 509.
162. See, e.g., Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894) (jury dismissed after
start of trial when court discovered that one juror had served on the grand jury that
indicted the defendant); Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) (jury dismissed
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bias an entire jury panel; discipline or removal of erring counsel
will not necessarily dispel such a taint, and cautionary instructions are not necessarily effective. Thus, the Court reasoned, a
trial court decision on such matters is entitled to great deference.
In Washington, the necessary high degree of manifest necessity
was present. "Neither party has a right to have his case decided
by a jury which may be tainted by bias."163
Finally, the Court ruled that the absence of a specific trial
court finding on manifest necessity does not mean appellate or
federal courts must conclude none existed. If the state court record contains enough to justify such a ruling, "the failure to explain that ruling more completely does not render it constitutionally defective."la Specific findings may be helpful but are not
constitutionally mandated. On the Washington record, the Court
found sufficient support for the trial court order of mistrial.
Washington principles also governed United States v.
ScottlB5later in the Term. In that case, the defendant attacked a
federal controlled substances prosecution on the basis of preindictment delay. The trial court dismissed two counts after all the
evidence had been received; the jury acquitted on the other.
When the government sought to appeal the dismissal, the court
of appeals rejected the appeal on the strength of United States
v. Jenkins. ls6 The Supreme Court reversed.
According to the Court, the key issue in determining whether
prosecution appeal is compatible with double jeopardy restrictions is whether a reevaluation of a case on the merits is possible.
If a second trial would not entail such a reevaluation, a court
must then inquire whether a defendant has been deprived unfairly of his or her right to a judgment on the merits by the trier
of fact first convened. When the defense moves for a mistrial, the
Court reasoned, the argument in favor of retrial is that the motion
embodies a considered decision to forgo the judgment of the jury
already sworn to try the case.
In reconsidering Jenkins, the Court opined that the operative
principle ought to be that retrial is constitutionally permissible
whenever "the defendant is responsible for the second prosecution."lB7In Scott, the defendant chose not to submit the issue of
after possible acquaintance of one juror and the defendant came to light after trial had
begun).
163. 434 U.S. at 516.
164. Id. at 517.
165. 98 S. Ct. 2187 (1978).
166. 420 U.S.358 (1975).
167. 98 S. Ct. at 2196.
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guilt or innocence to the jury, but rather invoked a legal claim
designed to forestall prosecution despite adequate government
evidence to convict. Burks was obviously distinguishable because
it turned on a judicial holding of insufficiency of prosecution
proof; Sanabria was similarly distinguished. The grounds relied
upon by the lower court in Scott, however, were independent of
guilt or innocence. The Court said that in other contexts courts
encounter "no difficulty in distinguishing between those rulings
which relate to 'the ultimate question of guilt or innocence' and
those which serve other purposes."lMThus, "the dismissal of an
indictment for preindictment delay represents a legal judgment
that a defendant, although criminally culpable, may not be punished because of a supposed constitutional violation."169
In essence, the underlying theory allowing retrial in Scott is
not waiver by the defendant, as it is in the Green context170where
the inquiry is into the scope of permissible retrial under an original indictment or information following reversal of a conviction
on appeal. Rather when no determination on the merits has been
sought or allowed, the Court believes the double jeopardy policy
of preventing harassment does not apply to an appeal by the
prosecution aimed at setting aside trial court action taken at
defense instance. Such a defendant, in the Court's view, "has not
been 'deprived' of his valued right to go to the first jury; only the
public has been deprived of its valued right to 'one complete
opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws.' "171
Consequently, Jenkins was overruled after an unusually brief
lifespan.
The last of the Court's 1978 double jeopardy decisions,
Swisher u. Brady,lT2dealt with juvenile delinquency adjudications. The litigation arose concerning a Maryland rule (which
underwent a process of modification in the course of the litigation) that provided for an initial hearing before a master who
submitted proposed findings to a juvenile court judge. The judge
could not conduct de novo hearings without consent of both parties, but could accept, reject, or modify the master's proposed
findings on both the fact of delinquency and disposition of an
adjudicated respondent. A three-judge federal court concluded
that this form of review by a juvenile court constituted double
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 2197 n.11.
Id. at 2197.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
98 S. Ct. at 2198 (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978)).
98 S. Ct. 2699 (1978).
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jeopardy and enjoined state officials from taking exception to
masters' findings of nondelinquency or disposition. The Supreme
Court reversed.
It was clear to the Court that hearings before a master place
a juvenile respondent in jeopardy;173but the controlling issue,
under the rationale of Arizona v. Washington, was whether the
state procedure allowed the prosecution an additional chance to
bolster its case. The Court concluded that it did not. The state
had but a single opportunity to make its presentation before a
master, and could adduce no additional evidence before a juvenile court unless the defense consented.
The Swisher plaintiffs also contended that to place the same
matter before both master and judge increased the risk that a n
innocent respondent might be adjudicated a delinquent. The
majority, however, thought that only the judge was an adjudicator under Maryland law, so that there was but one adjudication,
not a succession of adjudications. Nor did the Maryland procedure make possible a second trial, barred by Green, since the
juvenile court reviews only documents without supplementary
briefs or arguments and without the presence of the respondent
or counsel. And, even if these procedural attributes were present,
the Court reasoned that the result would be no different since this
would be similar to briefing and arguments following bench trial,
not to a second fullblown proceeding. Consequently, if a juvenile
court judge pursuant to local rule makes supplementary findings
sua sponte, in response to a state motion, or based on a defense
exception to the record before the master (or that record as supplemented by evidence to which neither party objects), there is
no double jeopardy violation.
3. Right to Counsel

The problem of representing multiple defendants is not easily solved, but the Court tried. In Holloway v. Arkansas, 175 a public defender assigned to represent three defendants in a robbery
and rape case indicated to the trial court, before trial, the probability of a conflict of interest. The trial court refused to pursue
the question then or later at trial when the possibility of conflict
173. In Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975),the Court outlawed adult proceedings
after a delinquency adjudication notwithstanding a subsequent finding that respondant
was unfit for treatment as a juvenile. As far as attachment of jeopardy is concerned, the
issue in Swisher was practically indistinguishable.
174. See text accompanying notes 154-56supra.
175. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
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became even more real. Ultimately, counsel was limited to plating each defendant on the witness stand to relate his own story
in his own words. The ensuing conviction of all three was affirmed
in a state appellate court because the record showed no substantial support for the defendants' claim of conflict of interest. The
Supreme Court disagreed.
is still the controlling
The Glasser v. United State~~~Vecision
law. To allow a single attorney to represent two or more clients
does not in itself violate the sixth amendment, since proper representation is possible, and may even be advantageous in many
instances. Defendants also can waive a constitutional objection.
And, even if a conflict exists, two important procedural issues
would normally face a court assessing a sixth amendment claim:
What showing must be made to reverse a conviction if counsel
failed to raise the possibility of conflict? And what is the extent
and nature of a trial court's duty to inquire on its own into possible conflicts? Holloway involved neither of these questions, however, because counsel actually advanced the issue. "The judge
then failed either to appoint separate counsel or to take adequate
steps to ascertain whether the risk was too remote to warrant
separate counsel.
Counsel might have urged his requests for appointment of
other counsel "more vigorously and in greater detail," but "the
trial court's responses hardly encouraged pursuit of the separatecounsel claim; and as to presenting the basis for that claim in
more detail, defense counsel was confronted with a risk of violating, by more disclosure, his duty of confidentiality to his
clients."178An attorney representing multiple clients is usually in
the best position to know whether there is a conflict; misstatements or other dilatory tactics would place an attorney in danger
of sanctions by the court for misconduct. A trial court can explore
the adequacy of the basis urged "without improperly requiring
disclosure of the confidential communications of the client."179
The trial court did not do that in Holloway.
An additional issue was whether reversal was required in the
absence of a showing of actual prejudice. The Court read Glasser
"as holding that whenever a trial court improperly requires joint
representation over timely objection reversal is automatic."180
176. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
177. 435 U.S. at 484.
178. Id. at 485.
179. Id. at 487.
180. Id. at 488.
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The right to counsel is basic, to the point that any infringement
in a capital case means automatic reversal. That counsel was
physically present during the proceeding does not justify a departure from the general rule, since the refusal to appoint separate
counsel may well have handicapped counsel in exploring possible
plea agreements, including leniency in return for turning prosecution evidence. "The mere physical presence of an attorney does
not fulfill the Sixth Amendment guarantee when the advocate's
conflicting obligations have effectively sealed his lips on crucial
matters."lgl A contrary rule requiring a showing of specific prejudice, the Court reasoned, "would not be susceptible of intelligent,
evenhanded application."la Some trial records may reveal prejudice, others may not. "Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless
error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation."lg3Accordingly, reversal was required. Three dissenting Justices, however, opposed the Court's per se reversal rule, and
would have preferred a requirement that a conflict be shown to
have "hampered a potentially effective defense."lg4
4. Jury instructions

The Court dealt with two rather troublesome standard jury
instructions. One was an instruction on a defendant's right of
silence delivered over defense objections. The other was an instruction on the presumption of innocence.
Lakeside v. Oregon1=continues unimpaired the Court's precedent that adverse comment on a claim of privilege, whatever
the source, impairs privilege, and that no pressure a t all can be
put on defendants to testify in their own behalf. The defense,
however, was wrong in suggesting that an instruction on privilege
can never be given over defense objection. Such a position rests
on two doubtful propositions; first, that jurors will not have noticed the failure of a defendant to testify and thus will draw no
adverse inference from that fact, and second, that the jury will
disregard a specific judicial instruction. "Federal constitutional
law cannot rest on speculative assumptions so dubious as
these."lg6Instructions of this sort are necessary, the Court said,
to "flag the jurors' attention to concepts that must not be misun181. Id. at 490.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 491.
184. Id. at 496 (Powell,J., dissenting).
185. 435 US. 333 (1978).
186. Id. at 340.
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derstood, such as reasonable doubt and burden of proof."lS7States
can decree otherwise by local rule, but a neutral instruction given
over defense objection does not infringe federal constitutional
rights.
The failure to accede to a defense objection also does not
deny the sixth amendment-right to counsel. Counsel does not
control otherwise legitimate decisions of a trial court. The right
to counsel is important, "[blut that right has never been understood to confer upon defense counsel the power to veto the wholly
permissible actions of the trial judge. It is the judge, not counsel,
who has the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of a fair and
lawful trial."ls8 Thus, the sixth amendment cannot "operate to
prevent a court from instructing a jury in the basic constitutional
principles that govern the administration of criminal justice."lm
The Court long ago had held that the presumption of innocence is "axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at
the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."190In
Taylor v. Kentu~ky,'~'
a trial court rejected a defense instruction
on the presumption and gave no equivalent of its own; its only
cognate instruction was on the prosecution burden to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Taylor's conviction was sustained in
the state appellate courts, but the Supreme Court reversed.
Even though the presumption may not be conceptually separate from the prosecution's ultimate burden of persuasion, there
has long been agreement that it should be the subject of an independent instruction of law to juries. Due process may not require
use of the phrase "presumption of innocence" or of any particular
formula, but, the Court said, it does dictate that nothing dilute
"the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt."lN A presumption-ofinnocence instruction "simply represents one means of protecting
the accused's constitutional right to be judged solely on the basis
of proof adduced a t trial."lg3
On the facts of Taylor, the Court held that omission of an
instruction on the presumption of innocence violated the defendant's due process rights. Trial court instructions in the case were
187. Id.
188. Id. at 341-42.
189. Id. at 342.
190. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S.432, 453 (1895).
191. 98 S. Ct. 1930 (1978).
192. Id. at 1935 (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976)).
193. Id. at 1935.
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"rather Spartan,"lg4and the prosecution's closing argument had
tied the defendant to every other convicted defendant and had
intimated that every accused person is guilty. Additionally, a t
other points the prosecutor had invited the jury to consider adversely the defendant's procedural status and to draw adverse
inferences from the fact of arrest and indictment. Although the
prosecutor's statements were not necessarily reversible error
standing alone, they created the need for careful countering instructions, requested by the defense but not given. The Court
reasoned that where trial was essentially a swearing-match between defendant and complainant, there was real danger that a
jury would convict on the basis of Taylor's status as defendant
rather than the weight of legal evidence.
The state argued that an instruction on burden of persuasion
was sufficient to alleviate the problem. The Court, however,
found that the trial court's instruction was no "model of clarity,"lg5using a formula criticized as confusing, though not of itself
constituting reversible error. Even if the instruction had been
clearer, it could not replace an instruction on the presumption of
innocence. Nor did oral argument on the matter, even if correct
in content, substitute for an instruction: "It was the duty of the
court to safeguard petitioner's rights, a duty only it could have
performed reliably." lg6
Taylor is offered by the majority as an ad hoc application of
due process concepts to peculiar circumstances, and not as a
general rule of constitutional procedure. In light of the Court's
decision, however, there seems little reason to withhold a properly
drawn instruction on the presumption of innocence requested by
the defense, if for no other reason than to avoid latent federal
constitutional problems.
5. Jury deliberations

A trial court must be extremely cautious about conversations
with a jury foreperson out of the presence of counsel. During jury
deliberations in United States u. United States Gypsum Co.,ln an
antitrust case, with the reluctant consent of counsel, the trial
judge spoke privately with the jury foreperson to determine the
physical condition of the jurors after five months of trial and
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1936.
196. Id. at 1937.
197. 98 S.Ct. 2864 (1978).
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seven days of sequestered deliberation. In the process, the judge
likely conveyed an expectation that the jury would reach a verdict
one way or another, and the jury convicted the following day.
This, the Supreme Court held, amounted to reversible error.
In effect, the trial judge delivered a modified Allen chargelg8
without affording counsel an opportunity to counter its impact.
"Any ex parte meeting or communication between the judge and
the foreman of a deliberating jury is pregnant with possibilities
for error."lDgThere is no way, the Court reasoned, to be sure of
the direction such a conversation will take; unexpected questions
can produce "unintended and misleading impressions of the
judge's subjective personal views which have no place in his instruction to the jury-all the more so when counsel are not present to challenge the statement^."^^ Counsel were led to believe
that only the condition of the jury would be discussed, whereas
something else was mentioned, suggesting a possibly deadlocked
jury in need of clarifying instructions given in the presence of
counsel. The error, therefore, was not solely the ex parte discussion, as undesirable as that may have been, but also the ensuing
consequences. There was a risk that innocent misstatements or
misinterpretations of legal points occurred when the foreperson
reported the conversations with the court to the entire panel,
and there was no way to determine later what was said a t that
time. The foreperson could have understood the judge to be insisting on a verdict, which would have been reversible error if
stated in an instruction. Hence, the Court concluded,' it
amounted to reversal grounds in this setting as well.

D. Sentencing and Punishment
1. Pro bation conditions
In Durst v. United States,"' the Court held that the payment
of fines and restitution may properly be a condition of probation
under the Federal Youth Corrections
The decision turns on
an interpretation of the special legislation in light of the general
federal probation statute,203but the analysis clearly accepts the
198. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896); AMERICAN
BARASSOCIATION
FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE,
STANDARDS
RELATING
TO TRIAL
BY JURY§ 5.4 and comSTANDARDS
mentary at 149-56 (Approved Draft, 1968).
199. 98 S. Ct. at 2885.
200. Id.
201. 434 U.S. 542 (1978).
202. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a) (1976).
203. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3656 (1976).

CRIMINAL LAW DECISIONS

4971

539

underlying constitutionality of such sanctions. Fines imposed as
a condition of probation are not necessarily punitive rather than
rehabilitative; they avoid "the harsh treatment of incarceration,
while assuring that the offender accepts responsibility for his
transgression. "204
2.

Capital punishment

the Court (eight Justices sitting) inIn two related cases,205
validated Ohio's death penalty statute because it severely limited
the mitigating factors used in determining whether to impose the
ultimate sanction. The defendant in Lockett v. 0hio206was convicted as an accomplice to a felony murder based on armed robbery; there was evidence suggesting either that she did not know
violence was to be used, or that she did not know a crime was
contemplated. Ohio law allowed consideration of only three mitigating factors: (1) inducement or facilitation of the crime by a
victim; (2) duress, coercion, or strong provocation without which
commission of the offense would have been unlikely; and (3) psychosis or mental deficiency of which the defendant's act was the
primary product. Presentence information did not trigger any of
these in Lockett's case, but other elements present might well
have made a difference.
The plurality opinion by the Chief Justice drew from the
Court's principal 1976 decisionsm7a holding by six Justices that
statutes must allow for an unlimited range of mitigating circumstances. Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment because, to
him, the capital penalty under any circumstances violates the
eighth amendment. Justice Blackmun was concerned about imposing the death penalty without consideration of the defendant's
mens rea and extent of involvement where vicarious liability principles are used." Mens rea was also the principal concern of
Justice White, who preferred "a finding that the defendant engaged in conduct with the conscious purpose of producing
death"209before the capital penalty could be exacted. Only Jus-tice Rehnquist would have sustained the statute because of his
view that the fairness of the proceeding imposing a death penalty
is the only issue of constitutional dimension. A similar division
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

434 U.S. at 554 (quoting the unpublished district court opinion).
Bell v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2977 (1978); Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978).
98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978).
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
See MODEL
PENAL
CODE9 2.06 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
98 S. Ct. at 2985 (White, J., dissenting in part).
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in analysis governs Bell v. Ohio,21o
the other challenge to the Ohio
statute last Term.
One can but hope that a majority rationale will soon emerge
to guide state legislatures, since there is much to support Justice
White's belief that the plurality rationale so undercuts the probable theoretical underpinnings of the 1976 decisions that the death
penalty will be as erratically imposed, when defense counsel have
unlimited freedom to submit possibly mitigating data, as it was
before Furman v. Georgia.211
3. Sentencing in noncapital cases

In sentencing decisions, federal trial courts may take account
of perjury committed by defendants during trial. In United States
v. Grayson212the trial judge candidly admitted considering defendant's perjury, which he thought had been amply demonstrated
a t trial; the court of appeals reversed for that reason. The Supreme Court reversed again, agreeing with the majority position
among federal courts of appeal that perjury is a legitimate factor
bearing on the sentencing process.
The Court surveyed penal theory and concluded that aggravating and mitigating factors bearing on an offense as such, and
not exclusively on rehabilitation, may be taken account of in
sentencing. Although presentence reports are important in providing background information for sentencing courts, both the
Court and Congress213have confirmed that sentencing courts can
consider information not in a presentence report. "A defendant's
truthfulness or mendacity while testifying on his own behalf, almost without exception, has been deemed probative of his attitudes toward society and prospects for rehabilitation and hence
relevant to sentencing."214One circuit had indicated that defendants are under such pressure to lie on their own behalf that the
fact should not be held against them, but the Court found this
to be "a deterministic view of human conduct that is inconsistent
with the underlying precepts of our criminal justice system."215
Grayson argued that to consider perjury in this way
amounted to punishment without charge, trial, and conviction;
but the reasons advanced in support of that argument were insuf210. 98 S. Ct. 2977 (1978).
211. 408 U.S.238 (1972).
'212. 98 S.Ct. 2610 (1978;.
213. See 18 U.S.C.5 3577 (1976).
214. 98 S.Ct. at 2616.
215. Id. at 2617.
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ficient to displace what the Court and Congress had previously
approved. Sentencing courts may consider all aspects of a defendant's character and life, as illustrated by Williams v. New
Y ~ r l z ,in
~ 'which
~
the sentencing court was permitted to consider
burglaries for which the defendant had not been formally
charged. Moreover, the Court reasoned, a contrary rule simply
would produce a lack of candor in judicial statements about factors used in support of sentence determinations, and thus would
be unenforceable.
The Court also rejected Grayson's premise that defendants
will not take the stand if they fear their testimony ultimately will
be used to justify a more severe sentence. The witness oath, the
Court countered, is not a meaningless ritual, and "[tlhere is no
protected right to commit perjury."217Moreover, Grayson does
not allow "a sentencing judge to enhance, in some wooden or
reflex fashion, the sentences of all defendants whose testimony is
deemed false."218Instead, a trial court must evaluate whether a
defendant's testimony indeed contained "willful and material
falsehoods, and, if so, assess in light of all the other knowledge
gained about the defendant the meaning of that conduct with
respect to his prospects for rehabilitation and restoration to a
useful place in
4. Prisoner detainers

The issue of whether, by issuing writs of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum to bring state prisoners to federal court, federal
judges trigger the time for trial required under the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers has troubled federal courts. The Court
~ O such a writ, standing alone,
held in United States v. M a ~ r o ~that
does not qualify as a detainer, but that if a true detainer has
already been filed the writ constitutes a "written request for temporary custody" of the prisoner which requires commencement of
federal trial within 120 days.
The Court held that the United States is bound by the agreement as both a sending and a receiving jurisdiction, and not
simply as a sending entity when states request custody of federal
prisoners. But analysis of habeas corpus ad prosequendum shows
that it does not resemble a detainer. A detainer indicates only
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

337 U.S. 241 (1949).
98 S. Ct. at 2618.

Id.
Id.
98 S . Ct. 1834 (1978).
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that a prisoner ultimately is wanted; it has the practical impact
of interfering with participation in rehabilitation programs and
delaying parole consideration. For these reasons the agreement
stresses prompt disposition of charges through transfer for trial.
A writ of habeas corpus, in contrast, requires swift compliance
and produces none of the adverse consequences wrought by a
detainer. Consequently, it is not a detainer within the agreement,
and the trial court improperly dismissed the pending federal prosecution of Mauro when he was returned to state custody before
federal trial.
In a case heard concurrently with Mauro in which a detainer
had been filed, however, a contrary result was indicated. There,
a federal writ would alleviate none of the adverse impact of a
previously filed detainer, so speedy disposition of the pending
federal case was required. Any interpretation of the agreement
permitting return of a prisoner without prompt trial as defined
in the agreement "would allow the Government to gain the advantages of lodging a detainer against a prisoner without assuming the responsibilities that the Agreement intended to arise from
such an action."221A prisoner does not have to spell out the details
of a failure to comply; an objection to delayed trial after receipt
of a detainer is enough.
5. Prison conditions

The Court this past Term in effect approved federal court
intervention in the operation of a state prison system if conditions
are sufficiently oppressive. In Hutto v. Finney212the state appealed a lower federal court ruling that disciplinary segregation
for more than thirty days under then-existing prison conditions
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court
affirmed. The district court did not hold that such a limitation
applies under all conditions, nor did the Supreme Court. Isolation
for the duration of sentence might not be objectionable if "new
conditions of confinement are not materially different from those
affecting other prisoner^."^^ Conversely, a "filthy, overcrowded
cell and a diet of ' g r ~ e might
' ~ ~ ~be tolerable for a few days and
intolerably cruel for weeks or months."225Length of confinement,
221.
222.
223.
224.

United States v. Ford, 98 S. Ct. 1834, 1849 (1978).
98 S. Ct. 2565 (1978)
Id. at 2572.

Grue is "a substance created by mashing meat, potatoes, oleo, syrup, vegetables,
eggs, and seasoning into a paste and baking the mixture in a pan." Id. at 2570.
225. Id. at 2572.
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the Court wrote, is but one of many factors properly considered
by a trial court in fashioning an order. The detailed order in
Finney's case was appropriate, however, in light of the state's
history of ignoring nonspecific federal mandates.
The matter of media access to jails and prisons is discussed
below.226

E. Remedies
1. Interlocutory appeal

The Court has previously allowed interlocutory appeals in
federal prosecutions, notably in instances of denial of bail reductionznand rejection of a claim of double jeopardy.228In both situations, trial would have produced the very evil the constitutional
right a t issue was designed to forestall. But in United States v.
McDonald229the Court refused to lengthen that list by adding
claimed denials of the right to a speedy trial.
McDonald, while in military service, was investigated in
connection with the murders of his wife and children. Some
months later, after no military charges had been filed, he was
honorably discharged. Nevertheless, the investigation continued
for another four years and nearly five years after the commission
of the crimes a federal grand jury indicted McDonald. He moved
to dismiss on combined grounds of double jeopardy and delayed
institution of proceedings which violated his due process rights
under United States b. Marion. 230 The district court rejected the
claim on the merits but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals lacked
jurisdiction to entertain an interlocutory appeal.
In contrast to the earlier contexts in which interlocutory appeal had been allowed the Court reasoned that whether delay has
in fact prejudiced a defendant cannot be determined until after
trial under the constitutional balancing test of Barker v. Wingo.
Although dismissal of prosecution is the only sanction which can
be invoked under the sixth amendment,232
this does not mean that
an interlocutory appeal must be granted.
Moreover, the Court wrote, to allow such appeals itself im226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

See text accompanying notes 278-86 infra.
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
435 U.S. 850 (1978).
404 U.S. 307 (1971); see also United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
407 U.S. 514 (1972).
Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
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perils the objectives of the sixth amendment since (even though
a defendant might wish to delay trial through appeal) the prosecution may be unable to prove its case later, costs increase
through maintaining defendants in pretrial detention, and provisionally released defendants can commit other crimes. Finally, no
showing is required of a defendant when submitting a claim of
delayed proceedings, as there is in the case of a claim of double
jeopardy; accordingly, any defendant could advance such a claim
and tie up proceedings for a considerable time by taking an appeal against denial of the motion. Thus, the Court held, no federal appellate court can entertain an interim appeal based on a
trial court determination of a speedy trial objection. State courts
naturally are free to shape their own jurisprudence on the matter
as they desire.
2. Federal ha beas corpus233

In deciding whether a state prisoner has exhausted state remedies, a federal district court cannot rely on the failure of a state
appeIlate court to refer to the matter in its opinion.234
If the prisoner has indeed advanced in the state proceeding the federal
constitutional grounds renewed in the federal habeas corpus proceeding and the state has answered, the exhaustion of remedies
requirementn5 has been complied with whether or not the state
appeals court elects to treat the legal issue in its opinion.
Federal habeas corpus is purely civil in character, and is
governed by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. In
fedBrow der u. Director, Illinois Department of
eral district court granted habeas corpus to a state prisoner, but
the state waited twenty-eight days to request a stay of the order
on the ground the court should not have entered it. A stay was
allowed and the trial court confirmed its order as proper. The
state then appealed and received a favorable judgment despite
the habeas corp,us petitioner's contention that there was no appellate jurisdiction under the federal rules. Specifically, Browder
urged that the state's notice of appeal was not filed within thirty
and that
days after entry of judgment as required in civil cases,237
the period was not tolled during the ensuing proceedings because
233. The function of habeas corpus ad prosequendum under the Interstate Agreement
on Detainers has been discussed in text accompanying notes 220-21 supra.
234. Smith v. Digmon, 434 U.S. 332 (1978).
235. Embodied in 28 U.S.C. 5 2254(b) (1976).
236. 434 U.S. 257 (1978).
237. 28 U.S.C. 6 2107 (1976); FED.R. APP. P. 4(a).
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the state's motion for rehearing was not submitted within ten
days of the habeas corpus order.238The state argued that the
details of federal civil rules practice do not govern habeas corpus,
but rather federal habeas corpus legislation, which contains no
time limitations, alone controls. The Supreme Court confirmed
Browder's position as the correct one.
The thirty-day period under the federal appellate rules is,
Therefore,
the Court wrote, "mandatory and jurisdi~tional."~~
the notice of appeal was untimely unless a state motion for a stay
was submitted promptly enough to toll the appeal period. The
habeas corpus order was a final one, however, and its finality was
not affected by the fact that its enforcement remained to be accomplished. Even assuming the district court erred in issuing the
writ, error is not the same as nonfinality; thus, any motion submitted under the civil rules should have been lodged within ten
days. Since the federal habeas corpus statute is silent on matters
of procedure, writ practice, being civil in nature, is governed by
regular civil rules unless their invocation impedes rather than
promotes the purposes of the extraordinary writ. Because speed
of habeas corpus is vital, as is finality, the civil rules periods
support rather than defeat the objectives of the statutory remedy.
Accordingly, the Court held, because the state did not meet the
jurisdictional and mandatory time limits, the appeal should have
been dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.
3. Section 1983240
federal civil rights proceedings
During the 1976-1977 Term, the Court's decisions served to
constrict the availability of relief under the original Federal Civil
Rights
Last Term its decisions were somewhat a mixed
bag, although in certain aspects the scope of relief was augmented.
It is most difficult to bring a state judicial officer within the
n~~~
scope of the federal legislation, as Stump v. S ~ a r k m a demonstrates. There, a mother had petitioned a judge of a general jurisdiction court to authorize the tuba1 ligation of a "somewhat re238. The state had not been specific whether it relied on FED.R. CIV.P. 52(b) (motion
to amend or enter additional findings), 59(a), (b) (motion for new trial), or 59(e) (motion
to alter or amend judgment).
239. 434 U.S. at 264.
240. 42 U.S.C. 8 1983 (1976).
241. See George, Criminal Law: Foreword-Doctrinal Doldrums: The Supreme Court
1976 Term Criminal Law Decisions, 68 J . CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY
469, 485-86 (1977).
242. 435 U S . 349 (1978).
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tarded" daughter who, she claimed, was sexually delinquent. She
had also stipulated to hold harmless the doctor and hospital involved in the operation. The judge, acting in his official capacity,
subsequently approved the petition and signed the order without
conducting a hearing. The daughter was told she was to have her
appendix removed. When two years later she married and failed
to conceive she discovered she had been sterilized and sued the
judge and other officials involved under the federal statute. The
trial court dismissed the complaint because the judge was immune to claims of federal liability and the acts of all other defendants were derivative from his action. The court of appeals reversed on the basis that the trial judge had exceeded his jurisdiction in entering the order and had forfeited immunity because of
his failure to accord the present plaintiff procedural due process.
The Supreme Court reversed.
The leading judicial immunity case243
is still controlling in its
grant of immunity to judges unless there is a "clear absence of
all jurisdi~tion."~~~
The Court held there was not that clear lack
under state law in Sparkman; nothing specifically prohibited the
exercise of the powers invoked by Judge Stump. Moveover, a
failure to follow procedural requirements, even a t the due process
level, does not eliminate judicial immunity. Only if a judge discharges a nonjudicial function can immunity be lost. A function
is judicial if "it is a function normally performed by a judge" and
the parties "dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity."245That
was clearly so in Sparkman. Informality of procedure, including
a want of docket number and the like, does not render a matter
nonjudicial within such a definition. Nor does tragedy of consequences produce that result, because the purpose of the immunity doctrine is to safeguard the ability of judges to function free
from the threat of litigation. Thus, the Court reasoned, the trial
court disposition of the matter was correct.
In Procunier v. N a ~ a r e t t e however,
, ~ ~ ~ the Court confirmed
its position that officials other than judges are protected by only
a qualified immunity: immunity does not lie if an official knew
or reasonably should have known that an activity would violate
the constitutional right at issue, or if an official acted with a
243. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
244. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 357 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335, 351 (1872)). A like immunity protects administrative adjudicators. Butz v.
Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978).
245. 435 U.S. at 362.
246. 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
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"malicious intention" to bring about a deprivation of known constitutional rights or other injury. Navarette involved prison administrators as federal defendants, but the scope of immunity
had already been established in instances of a state governor,247
school officials,24Ra mental hospital ~ u p e r i n t e n d e n t ,and
~ ~ ~police.2mOn the facts of Navarette, there was no clear establishment
of the claimed constitutional right a t the time the litigation
began, the right having been established by the Supreme Court
in litigation subsequent to the initiation of the law~uit.~"
Consequently, there was no intentional or negligent violation of constitutional rights since defendants "could not reasonably have been
expected to be aware of a constitutional right that had not yet
been declared. "252
Monell v. New York City Department of Social ServicesZJ3
overruled the Court's earlier holding that municipalities are totally immune from Civil Rights Act suits,2s4holding that such
governmental units are liable for "action pursuant to official
municipal policy of some nature [that] caused a constitutional
tort."2ss They cannot, however, be held liable under a respondeat
superior theory simply because they employ tortfeasors; such a
broad extension, in the Court's view, would bring about results
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act indicates Congress
intended to avoid. "Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by
those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official
policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is
responsible . . . ."256
In Alabama v. P ~ g h , ~however,
"
the Court held that the
eleventh amendment prevents suit against a state government or
one of its state-level departments unless the state consents. The
Alabama State Constitution forbade such a consent, and there247. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
248. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
249. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
250. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
251. The violation alleged in Navarette was improper interference with prisoners'
outgoing correspondence which occurred before the Supreme Court had established a
constitutional right to be free from such interference in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396 (1974).
252. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. at 565.
253. 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978).
254. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
255. 98 S. Ct. at 2036.
256. Id. at 2038.
257. 98 S. Ct. 3057 (1978).
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fore the case was remanded with orders to dismiss the state and
its department of corrections from the proceedings. The doctrine
has the nature of a jurisdictional bar which need not be asserted
in a trial
Carey u. Piphus2" teaches that a Federal Civil Rights Act
plaintiff must prove actual injury caused by the denial of procedural due process or recover only the nominal sum of one dollar.
The purpose of section 1983 is "to compensate persons for injuries
caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights."260If a constitutional right parallels a tort claim the same damage rules govern, but otherwise a plaintiff must establish a measure for damages. In Piphus, students who had been suspended from school
without administrative due process would have to prove actual
emotional distress and its effect on them before compensatory
damages could be awarded. Absent such proof only nominal damages were available; punitive damages were not merited since the
lower court specifically found a lack of malicious intent on the
part of the school board. The Court left open the question of
whether punitive damages might be awarded to deter intentional
deprivations of rights, since none was alleged in P i p h ~ s . ~ ~ '
Within limits, whether a Civil Rights Act proceeding survives the death of a plaintiff is determined by the law of the state
in which the action complained of occurred. In Robertson v.
Wegrnann262
the plaintiff died without leaving an heir qualified
under Louisiana law to continue the action. His executor sought
to pursue the federal action on the ground that federal common
law governed the survival of actions; the lower federal courts
agreed but the Supreme Court reversed.
The Civil Rights Act itself recognizes that if statutory language does not cover a matter, federal courts turn to "the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the [forum] State,"263if not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. Federal law generally does
not cover survival of actions, although state law does. Nothing in
the Louisiana survivorship statutes in any way conflicted with
the achievement of the basic purposes of section 1983. Since
spouses, children, parents, and siblings could continue an action,
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 3058 n.1.
435 U.S. 247 (1978).
Id. at 254.
Id. at 257 n.11.
98 S. Ct. 1991 (1978).
42 U.S.C. 4 1988 (1976).
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denying a decedent's estate the right to do so was not unreasonable. Nothing in the federal law appears to require compensation
of an estate as such, and the possibility of abatement of a federal
civil rights action is unlikely to affect the conduct of state officials
aware t h a t unconstitutional conduct invites federal suit. The
Court considered only the validity of Louisiana law; it did not
resolve the issue presented by a state system allowing survival
only for sharply limited classes of actions or recognizing no survival a t all. The Court also reserved comment on the situation in
which death itself resulted from a deprivation of federal civil
rights. The fact that abatement can occur, however, is not a
sufficient ground to find inconsistency with federal law. The three
dissenters, in contrast, agreed with the lower courts and suggested the need for remedial federal legislation.
Hutto v. Finney2" dealt significantly with recovery of counsel
fees in civil rights actions. The Court had held in 1975 that, as a
general rule, counsel fees could not be awarded under thenexisting legislation, with the possible exception of cases involving
bad faith on the part of defendants.265In Finney state officials
objected to the award of $20,000 in counsel fees but the Court
sustained the award. The Court felt that bad faith on the part of
state officials was evident throughout the litigation, and the district court clearly intended the fee award to be a sanction not
unlike a remedial fine for civil contempt. That being so, the indication that the state department of corrections was to pay the fee
did not render the order invalid, even though the order probably
should not have contained that language.266
The state also objected to a further award by the court of
appeals of $2,500 to cover the costs and expenses of appeal, arguing that such awards would violate the eleventh amendment unless the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Award Act of 1975267was
specifically applicable to states as defendants. The Court disagreed. Inclusion of attorney's fees within costs is a matter of substantial history, so that "[ilt is much too late to single out attorney's fees as the one kind of litigation cost whose recovery may
not be authorized by Congress without an express statutory
waiver of the States' imm~nity."~"The legislative purpose to
264. 98 S. Ct. 2565 (1978) (also discussed in text accompanying notes 222-25 supra)
265. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y., 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (19%).
266. See Alabama v. Pugh, 98 S. Ct. 3057 (1978) (discussed in text accompanying
notes 257-58 supra).
267. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (enacted to overcome Alyeska Pipeline).
268. 98 S. Ct. at 2577-78.
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allow this form of costs against defendants was clear.
The fact that neither the state nor the department of corrections was expressly named as a defendant was also undeterminative. An action for injunctive relief against named prison officials
was in effect an action against the state itself and was treated by
the latter as such, since the state attorney general defended the
original action and lodged the appeal. The state attorney general
could not argue that the individual defendants should bear the
liability personally and then look to the state for whatever relief
they could obtain. Finally, the Court reasoned, the named litigants were not responsible for the bad faith litigation in the federal court of appeals and thus the state should bear directly the
burden of the award.

F. T h e Police
The Court rendered two decisions that impact on law enforcement officers as such, but not in the context of criminal
procedural responsibilities. In Commissioner v. K o w a l ~ k state
i~~~
police objected to inclusion by the IRS of meal allowances given
to troopers as taxable income. The state police had abandoned
the system of having troopers report to meal stations because it
took them from patrol for too long a time. Therefore, the state
legislature provided an annual meal allowance increased according to rank; troopers could eat anywhere they chose, including
their homes if nearby, or carry their own meals with them on
patrol. The Tax Court ruled that the meal allowance was income
and not within the concept of meals furnished for an employer's
c o n v e n i e n ~ eThe
. ~ ~ Third Circuit reversed on the basis of an earlier decision that meal allowances were not taxable income. The
Supreme Court agreed with the Tax Court's position.
Unless payments fall within a specific statutory exemption
they must be viewed as income under the broad statutory definition of that term. The Court wrote that preenactment materials
indicate clearly that the exemption of meals furnished for the
convenience of the employer was not intended to cover cash payments of any kind, and Congress has never excluded from income cash allowances of any sort. The specific exemption in the
Internal Revenue Code for military subsistence allowances cre269. 434 U.S.77 (1977).
270. While I.R.C. 8 119 provides that meals furnished for the convenience of the
employer are exempt from taxation, the Tax Court held the patrolman's meal allowance
to be income under the general rule of I.R.C. § 61(a).
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ates no inequity to be removed through judicial construction of
the statute. Congress had already rejected the state troopers'
premise by repealing an earlier provision271that had allowed
troopers to exclude subsistence allowances of up to five dollars per
day. This was intended to take from them an advantage other
taxpayers did not enjoy. The dissenters disagreed with the majority interpretation, noting that "state troopers the country over,
not handsomely paid to begin with, will never understand today's
decision."272In September 1978 Congress was considering overturning Kowalski by statutory amendment.273
In Foley v. C ~ n n e l i the
e ~ ~Court
~ ruled that states may consistently with equal protection exclude aliens from consideration for
police employment. "The essence of our holdings to date is that
although we extend to aliens the right to education and public
welfare, along with the ability to earn a livelihood and engage in
licensed professions, the right to govern is reserved to citizens."275
Police have substantial discretion to regulate citizen conduct,
arrest, detain, search, and seize; this "calls for a very high degree
of judgment and discretion, the abuse or misuse of which can
have serious impact on individuals."276"In short, it would be as
anomalous to conclude that citizens may be subjected to the
broad discretionary powers of noncitizen police officers as it
would be to say that judicial officers and jurors with power to
judge citizens can be aliens."277Thus, in this instance citizenship
bears a rational relationship to the special demands of the particular employment, and therefore the classification does not violate
the dictates of equal protection.

A. First Amendment Concerns
Attention has been given above to the first amendment implications of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,27R
which has generated a
wave of protest on the part of the communications industry. By
271. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 120, 68A Stat. 39 (repealed 1958).
272. 434 U.S. at 98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
273. See H.R. 13205, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). In Massachusetts v. United States,
435 U.S. 444 (1978), the Court refused to exempt state-owned police aircraft from the
registration fee imposed on all private and civil governmental aircraft. User fees do not
violate an implied immunity of state government against federal taxation.
274. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
275. Id. at 297.
276. Id. at 298.
277. Id. at 299.
278. 98 S . Ct. 1970 (1978) (discussed in text accompanying notes 38-42 supra).
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midyear 1978 several bills had been introduced in Congress to
repudiate the holding, at least as far as premises owned by media
corporations are concerned.279But, although Zurcher captured
headlines, other decisions last Term also significantly delineated
the interrelationships between the justice system and the media
under the first amendment.
In Houchins v. KQED, Inc2" the Court dealt with the issue
of press and public access to possibly substandard jail facilities-a question left undetermined by the Court's 1974 decisions
denying a claimed right by reporters to interview prisoners of
KQED is difficult to analyze in terms of rationale
their
and future impact, because two Justices did not sit, and the
remaining members of the Court divided three-one-three.
The litigation arose when the radio station, joined by civil
rights groups, sought access to parts of a local detention facility
in which rapes and suicides reportedly had occurred. The defendant sheriff responded by instituting monthly tours by not more
than twenty-five citizens. The tours involved neither interviews
with nor observations of prisoners and apparently did not extend
to the areas where the incidents allegedly had occurred. KQED
and other media representatives went on the initial tour, but
insisted on greater rights of access. A federal district court preliminarily enjoined the sheriff from denying news personnel access to
all parts of the facility a t reasonable times and hours and from
preventing use of photographic and sound equipment to record
conditions; it found no invasion of resident privacy in such an
order. The court of appeals affirmed.
Four Justices voted to vacate the order as too broad. Chief
Justice Burger's plurality opinion concluded that, absent a legislative determination to the contrary, "the media has no right,
special [sic] of access to [a detention facility] different from or
greater than that accorded the public generally?" To this group
of Justices, the press is "not a substitute for or an adjunct of
government,"283and is ill equipped, like the courts, to cope with
problems of prison administration. Every jurisdiction has some
public body with authority to inquire into prison and jail condi279. See, e.g., H.R. 12952, H.R. 13145, H.R. 13169, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). One
may assume that such legislation, if enacted, would affect only federal proceedings.
280. 98 S. Ct. 2588 (1978).
281. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pel1 v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817 (1974).
282. 98 S. Ct. a t 2597.
283. Id. a t 2594.
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tions and publish reports which become available to press and
public. Moreover, in the Chief Justice's view, there is nothing to
indicate that press investigations are more likely to uncover public malfeasance than official bodies; if anything, the latter are
under more public pressure to report improper conditions than
are private institutions like the media.
Thus, the media are relegated by the plurality to the same
sources of information as members of the public. Officials cannot
prevent correspondence with prisoners, conversations with legal
representatives of inmates, and interviews with former inmates,
visitors, and officials of many kinds. Otherwise, the first amendment mandates no right of access to government information or
sources of information within public control.
Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment, but seems closer
in philosophy to the three Justices who wished to affirm the lower
court action. Thus, his rationale may be closest to a position
which four of the seven sitting Justices might accept. He agreed
with the Burger premise that
[tlhe First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the
public a right of access to information generated or controlled
by government, nor do they guarantee the press any basic right
of access superior to that of the public generally. The Constitution does no more than assure the public and the press equal
access once government has opened its doors.2R4

To Justice Stewart, however, "equal access" requires differentiation between the media and the public, particularly, more ample
access to facilities than participation in a brief monthly tour
would afford. Therefore, the portion of the district court order
requiring the sheriff to provide media access a t reasonable hours
and times was "both sanctioned by the Constitution and amply
supported by the record."2R5
But the order was too broad in allowing media access to portions of the jail not open to the public and
permitting random interviews initiated by reporters. After reversal, Justice Stewart would have left it open to the trial court to
"accommodate equitably the constitutional role of the press and
the institutional requirements of the jail."286
The three dissenting Justices would have sustained the disposition below because it would have eliminated the broad restraint on access to information about jail operations that both
284. Id. a t 2598 (Stewart, J., concurring).
285. Id. a t 2599.
286. Id.
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public and press ought to have had. In the dissent's view, media
access would have ended the obvious policy of concealment the
sheriff was invoking and would have opened to public view an
aspect of governmental operations affecting the liberty of both
convicts and preconviction detainees presumed to be innocent.
Whether a majority of the full Court, including Justices Blackmun and Marshall, considering a similar factual situation would
rest with Chief Justice Burger or Justice Stevens is a matter of
speculation, as is the true holding of KQED. Meanwhile, prison
authorities are under no particular inducement to facilitate investigative reporting on conditions within their institutions, although many state systems are much more open now to media
access than was true a decade ago.
According to Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 287 even
evidence forming a part of court records is not available to either
the public or the press under all circumstances. There, a private
corporation sought, for broadcast and commercial sale, copies of
tapes introduced in evidence a t the Watergate trials. During the
Watergate trials themselves, Judge Gesell had ruled that, while
a common law privilege of access to judicial records applied, there
could be no copying until criminal trials had been completed and
procedures to avoid overcommercialization submitted for judicial
approval. After criminal proceedings were completed the subsidiary litigation reverted to Judge Sirica, who refused to grant immediate access because the convicted Watergate defendants
might be prejudiced during appeal. He also thought the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act288forestalled a
need for immediate release because of the administrative procedures it embodied. The court of appeals reversed because it found
the mere possibility of prejudice to the rights of the Watergate
defendants in the event of retrial insufficient to outweigh the
common law privilege of access. The Supreme Court reversed in
turn.
The Court recognized a "general right to inspect and copy
public records and documents, including judicial records and
document^."^^ The right does not turn on a proprietary interest
in the documents or a need to use them in litigation, but can
reflect a watchdog function. But, the Court reasoned, such a
claim is not absolute, and any court can control access to records
sought for an improper purpose such as promotion of public or
287. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
288. 44 U.S.C. 4 4 2107 note, 3315-3324 (Supp. V 1975)).
289. 435 U.S. at 597-99.
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private scandal, dissemination of libelous statements, and release
of business information of value to competitors.
The ex-President asserted a proprietary interest in the material and an infringement of privacy if the records were released.
He also argued the confidentiality of the records based on the
Court's 1974 Ninon decision on the Watergate tapes,290as well as
the impropriety, granted the marginal addition to public knowledge which marketing would accomplish, of commercializing the
tapes through private release. The Court, however, refused to
engage in any balancing of interests because the Presidential Recordings Act, already sustained as valid,2u had set forth an administrative procedure to determine release of such materials.
The existence of this alternative mode of release resolved the
litigation in the Warner Communications setting.
Warner Communications also urged that the first amendment required release. But the Court held only that there is a
"right of the press to publish accurately information contained in
court records open to the public,"B2a premise also prominent in
the plurality opinion in KQED. Warner Communications did not
involve that form of public record, but rather copies of tapes to
which the public had never been given direct access. The first
amendment "generally grants the press no right to information
about a trial superior to that of the general public."293
Nor, in the Court's view, did the right to a public trial govern. There is no right to have trial proceedings recorded and
broadcast, and the sixth amendment confers no special rights on
the press. Public trial rights are satisfied if members of the public
and press alike are given an opportunity to attend trials and
report what they observe.
Once a communications enterprise gains access to information about governmental operations, however, it cannot be punished for disseminating it. So held the Court in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia.294Virginia law made it a misdemeanor to divulge information about proceedings before a state
judicial review commission inquiring into judicial misconduct.
The defendant newspaper discovered the nature of an inquiry,
including the name of a judge under investigation, and published
-

p
p

-

-- -

290. United States v. Nixon, 418 U S . 683 (1974).
291. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U S . 425 (1977).
292. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U S . at 609 (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U S . 469 (1975)).
293. Id.
294. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
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the information accurately. It was found guilty despite a claim of
first amendment protection. The state supreme court affirmed.
The state court reasoned that since punishment had occurred
after publication rather than before there had been no prior restraint. The proper standard was. the clear and present danger
test, which the state court found to have been satisfied because
of the policies of protecting a judge's reputation during initial
investigation, maintaining public confidence in the state's judicial system, and safeguarding complainants and witnesses
against recrimination. Furthermore, the state court reasoned that
the enactment of the statute amounted to a legislative declaration that divulgence of commission proceedings constituted a
clear and present danger to the administration of justice. The
Supreme Court reversed.
The Court recognized that reliance on judicial tenure and
disciplinary commissions is almost universal among the states.
Confidentiality is important to commission effectiveness, in that
it encourages complaint filing and protects judges and the judiciary as an institution from publication of charges that may prove
unfounded. Confidentiality also facilitates the work of a judicial
commission by encouraging retirement or resignation of respondent judges without a formal hearing, and by enabling minor
matters to be corrected without formal proceedings. However,
only Virginia and Hawaii among the forty-nine jurisdictions with
such a procedure impose criminal penalties for disclosure of information obtained by a judicial commission.
Landmark Communications did not present the issue of
criminality of someone who obtains information unlawfully and
then publishes it. It also involved no claim of a media right of
accessa5 or of prior restraint. The newspaper, however, argued
that truthful reporting about public officials in connection with
official duties is always insulated from criminal sanctions. The
Court did not find it necessary to endorse that sweeping general
contention, but did find the paper's interest in publication so
close to the "core of the First Amendment"296that nothing the
state advanced as a protected interest outweighed it.
The first amendment was intended to protect free discussion
of public affairs; judges and courts are not exempt from such
scrutiny. There was, therefore, a legitimate public interest in the
295. Any claim to a media right of access was effectively foreclosed later in the Term
in Warner Communications and KQED, discussed at notes 280-93 supra.
296. 435 U.S.at 838.
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proceedings of the state judicial inquiry commission. The state
advanced nothing to justify the use of criminal penalties under
such circumstances, particularly in light of the fact that so many
other jurisdictions have found it unnecessary to do so. Accordingly, the need to preserve the confidentiality of an inquiry system cannot legitimate infliction of criminal punishment after the
fact of publication.
The Court also questioned whether the clear and present
danger test applied in such a context; certainly, it had no mechanical application. A legislative declaration that a clear and
present danger exists does not resolve the matter.2Q7The state
court should have gone behind the legislative statement; had it
done so, the Court stated, it would have found nothing which
could constitute Landmark Communications' publication a clear
and present danger.
In short, in the Court's thinking, investigative reporting remains an element of free enterprise. Official barriers cannot be
imposed against investigating in the general community, as
KQED indicates. Lawbreaking media representatives are no
more insulated from sanctions than other members of the public,
or so Landmark Communications appears to intimate. However,
if the public has access to something, so does the press. Media
representatives cannot claim the affirmative support of government to acquire information unavailable to the public generally,
and, as Zurcher holds, neither can they resist lawful judicial process for designated evidence. Thus, government and media organizations are not peers and are not to be made so through invocation of the first amendment. In short, the Term's decisions confirm Chief Justice Burger's notation that the media indeed "are
not a substitute for or an adjunct of government."298Whether they
should be is a matter open to debate.
297. Chief Justice Burger wrote:
A legislature appropriately inquires into and may declare the reasons impelling
legislative action but the judicial function commands analysis of whether the
specific conduct charged falls within the reach of the statute and if so whether
the legislation is consonant with the Constitution. Were it otherwise, the scope
of freedom of speech and of the press would be subject to legislative definition
and the function of the First Amendment as a check on legislative power would
be nullified.
Id. at 844.
298. Houchins v. KQED,Inc., 98 S. Ct. at 2594.
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B. Federal 0 bscenity Legislation
The Court's earlier efforts to redefine constitutional limits on
regulation of obscenity have not appreciably reduced the scope of
litigation, as a perusal of federal and state appellate decisions
reveals.29gThe Court dealt only with minor aspects of the problem
this past Term in the case of Pinkus u. United States.30o
Pinkus had been convicted of violating the primary federal
statute prohibiting transmission of obscene matter through the
mails,301on facts arising before the Court's key 1973 decisions.302
It was stipulated that the defendant knowingly sent the material
a t issue to adults within California and elsewhere. Because the
Roth-MemoirsJo3test governed a t the time, the defense placed
considerable reliance on expert testimony demonstrating that the
materials did not appeal to prurient interest, conflict with community standards, or lack redeeming social value. The prosecution offered contrary expert data. Pinkus was convicted and the
court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed.
Pinkus' first objection was to the inclusion of "children"
within the definition of "community standards" given by the trial
court.304The court of appeals thought it would have been better
to omit reference to children but did not reverse in the absence
of Supreme Court authority on point. The Court noted that the
matter might well have been ruled harmless in Pinkus' case, but
recognized the legitimacy of the need to have Court clarification
of the question. "[Wle elect to take this occasion to make clear
t h a t children are not to be included . . . as part of the
'community' as that term relates to the 'obscene materials' proscribed by [the statute]."305In the absence of proof that children
were the intended recipients of the material in Pinkus, or reason
299. See generally George, Obscenity Litigation: An Overview of Current Legal
Controversies, 3 NAT'LJ . CRIM.DEF.189 (1977).
300. 98 S. Ct. 1808 (1978). There is a cognate decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978), which conforms the power of the FCC to invoke administrative
sanctions for broadcasting indecent words to federal criminal coverage in 18 U.S.C. § 1464
(1976).
301. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976).
302. Principally, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
303. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957).
304. The jury instruction read, "In determining community standards, you are to
consider the community as a whole, young and old, educated and uneducated, the religious and the irreligious, men, women and children, from all walks of life." Pinkus v.
United States, 98 S. Ct. a t 1811 (emphasis in the original).
305. Id. a t 1812. This holding had been signaled by the Court's decision in Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957), which disallowed the protection of minors as the sole basis
for prohibiting the dissemination of allegedly obscene materials to adults.
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on the defendant's part to know they might receive it, the jury
should not have been instructed that children were part of the
66
community." The Court concluded that the giving of such an
instruction was reversible error.
The defendant also objected to including "sensitive" persons
within the standard, but the Court thought this not to be error.
Even though statements in Roth and Miller had indicated that
average rather than particularly susceptible and sensitive (or
unsusceptible and insensitive) persons provide the standard, this
does not mean that sensitive or insensitive persons, however defined, are to be excluded from the definition of community.
In the narrow and limited context of this case, the community
includes all adults who comprise it, and a jury can consider
them all in determining relevant community standards. The
vice is in focusing upon the most susceptible or sensitive members when judging the obscenity of materials, not in including
them along with all others in the community.306

The Court noted the difficulty in framing instructions on the
point, particularly as to what "sensitive" and "insensitive"
mean, but persons thus characterized are part of the community
and may be properly referred to in jury instructions.
Pinkus also found fault with instructions about "deviant sexual groups" in defining prurient interest. In the Court's analysis,
however, the materials a t issue, or some of them, probably would
have appealed to such a group. "Nothing prevents a court from
giving an instruction on prurient appeal to deviant sexual groups
as part of an instruction pertaining to appeal to the average person when the evidence, as here, would support such a charge."307
The Court reconfirmed that expert testimony is unnecessary
to a decision that materials are obscene. The defendant argued,
however, that the prosecution should be required to advance evidence to aid a jury in determining what will stimulate deviant
groups. The Court rejected this contention, noting that the prosecution in this case had in fact presented expert testimony "which,
when combined with the exhibits themselves, sufficiently guided
In Pinkus, therefore, the trial court instruction was
the
proper.
The opinion also noted that a pandering instruction30gis al306. 98 S.Ct. at 1813.
307. Id. at 1814.
308. Id. at 1815.
309. See George, supra note 299,at 202-03.
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ways relevant to aid a jury in determining whether materials are
obscene in light of the ways they were created, promoted, or disseminated. The government's evidence in Pinkus was adequate
to support such an instruction, even though it was not extensive
on "methods of production, editorial goals, if any, methods of
operation, or means of delivery other than the mailings and the
names, locations, and occupations of the recipients."310

C. Miscellaneous Statutory Interpretation
The Court dealt with a somewhat esoteric aspect of the Clean
Air Act311which empowered the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to promulgate emission standards for
hazardous air pollutants.312Violations of the Act are made criminal.313The statute also specifically forbids judicial review of administrative action promulgating an emission standard except in
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit within
thirty days after promulgation of such a standard.314
In Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States,315defendant company was indicted in connection with asbestos standards relating
to building demolition. The regulation in question set out procedures to be used in demolition but did not set a specific emission
level. The district court granted a motion to dismiss the indictment because it thought the regulation was not actually an emission standard although labeled as such. The court of appeals
reversed on the basis that anything promulgated as such was an
emission standard under section 112(c) of the statute, and therefore unreviewable within the terms of the Act. The Supreme
Court reversed.
The Court characterized the issue as "[wlhen is an emission
standard not an emission standard?"316Under an earlier deci~ i o n , ~questions
l'
involving the nonreviewability of administrative
310. Pinkus v. United States, 98 S. Ct. at 1815. Because of the way the Court disposed
of the case, it did not pass on the question of whether the trial court had acted properly
in rejecting defense comparison evidence in the form of films which assertedly had popular
acceptance in Los Angeles and elsewhere in the country, and thus demonstrated community tolerance of the material Pinkus was charged with having mailed; the court of
appeals was left free to resolve the issue on remand.
311. 42 U.S.C.A. 0 0 7401 et seq. (Supp. 1977).
312. 42 U.S.C.A. 8 7412(b)(l)(B) (Supp. 1977).
313. 42 U.S.C.A. 0 7413(c)(l)(C) (Supp. 1977).
314. 42 U9S.C.A. 0 7607(b)(l) (Supp. 1977).
315. 434 U S . 275 (1978).
316. Id. a t 278.
317. Yakus v. United States, 321 U S . 414 (1944) (sustaining the validity of a provision of the Wartime Emergency Price Control Act that forbade contesting the validity of
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regulations are not to be determined routinely. The Clean Air Act
precluded review of but one class of regulations, not all regulations issued under its provisions. Moreover, Congress imposed
criminal penalties for only some violations. The statute as a
whole indicates that emission standards are of greater significance than other standards or regulations; hence the limitation
on judicial review. But, the Court determined, under the canon
of strict construction of criminal legislation, a criminal trial court
may determine whether a regulation upon which prosecution is
based is indeed an emission standard as delineated in the statute.
This does not mean that federal district courts can review a standard generally, considering such matters as whether an agency
complied with administrative promulgation procedures or
whether it acted arbitrarily or capriciously. The only issue is
whether the regulation in question is, on its face, an emission
standard as defined by Congress.
On the merits of Adamo Wrecking, the Court found much to
indicate that an emission standard must incorporate a level of
pollution and not merely methods of avoiding pollution. While a
subsequent amendment to the statute would not necessarily govern a decision relating to earlier conduct, a majority of the Court
found, contrary to the prosecution argument, that a 1977 statutory reformulation confirmed the importance of emission levels
and the distinction between such levels and work practice standards. Therefore, on the facts of the case, the district court ruled
correctly.
Adamo Wrecking is thus a rather narrow ruling on a point
esoteric to those not charged under the legislation. The Court
certainly took pains to avoid opening up the constitutionality of
legislation regulating the environment. Nevertheless, several
asides by the Justices reflecting on a legislative ban on contesting
regulations, a t least in the context of criminal prosecutions,
seems to signal a significant constitutional issue for later resolution.
.
The Sherman Antitrust Act is not strict liability legislation
under the Court's view in United States v. United States Gypsum
Co.31R The government alleged that six primary manufacturers of
gypsum board had conspired to fix prices, principally through the
exchange of pricing information. At trial, the court instructed
that the defendants were presumed to intend the necessary and
regulations in the course of any civil or criminal proceeding).
318. 98 S.Ct. 2864 (1978).A procedural aspect of the case is discussed in text accompanying notes 197-200 supra.
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natural consequences of their acts. It also in effect ruled out reliance on compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act31gas a defense
to Sherman Act charges. Finally, it restricted the defense of withdrawal from a conspiracy to affirmative notice to all other members of a conspiracy or disclosure .of an illegal enterprise to law
enforcement officials. The jury convicted but the court of appeals
reversed; the Supreme Court affirmed.
A majority of the Court thought that strict liability could not
be imposed under the antitrust law:
[A] defendant's state of mind or intent is an element of a
criminal antitrust offense which must be established by evidence and inferences drawn therefrom and cannot be taken from
the trier of fact through reliance on a legal presumption of
wrongful intent from proof of an effect on prices.32o

There is nothing in the history of the legislation to signal a congressional purpose to make violations of the Act strict liability
offenses. Moreover, the sweep of the language is broad (although
not unconstitutionally vague and indefinite), and the punishment severe. There is a sufficient array of noncriminal enforcement measures under the statute to leave it enforceable without
exacting strict liability criminal penalties. To meet its burden
under the statute so construed, the government can rely on the
premise that "action undertaken with knowledge of its probable
consequences and having the requisite anticompetitive effects
can be a sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal liability
under the antitrust laws."321As the Court noted, ''[;]here carefully planned and calculated conduct is being scrutinized in the
context of a criminal prosecution, the perpetrator's knowledge of
the anticipated consequences is a sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal intent."322The trial court did not instruct properly
in this respect.
The Court then turned to the question of whether verification
of competitor price concessions, intended solely to fit within section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act,3Wshould also amount to
a controlling circumstance precluding liability under section 1of
the Sherman Act.324
The Court concluded a good faith belief that
319. 15 U.S.C. $ 4 13-13b, 21a (1976). Section 13(b) relates to exchange of price
information to meet competition.
320. 98 S. Ct. at 2872.
321. Id. at 2877.
322. Id. at 2878.
323. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976).
324. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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a price concession is offered to meet a correspondingly low price
set by a competitor is a defense under the Robinson-Patman Act,
and is available to defend against an antitrust prosecution as
well. The Court discussed the likelihood of isolated inquiries
being used successfully as a defense to a federal prosecution, and
found little danger. However, "exchanges of price information-even when putatively for purposes of Robinson-Patman Act
compliance-must remain subject to close scrutiny under the
Sherman
The majority also found error in the trial court's instructions
on withdrawal from a conspiracy. A more expansive version had
been requested by defendants, and there is precedent for modes
of withdrawal other than those to which the trial court limited
jury consideration: affirmative actions inconsistent with the object of a conspiracy and communicated in a manner reasonably
calculated to reach coconspirators, for example. Thus, a broader
instruction was to be given on retrial, although regrettably the
Court did not draft one for the guidance of federal trial courts.
In United States v. C ~ l b e r tthe
, ~ Court
~ ~ construed the Hobbs
ActSn as not requiring proof of "racketeering" as a condition to
conviction. The defendant, charged with having committed attempted bank robbery through threats of physical violence to an
officer of a federally insured bank, claimed that such an element
was indispensable. The Court disagreed.
The statutory language is clear in covering robbery as a
means of obstructing interstate commerce; nothing on its face
refers to a requirement of racketeering. Indeed, to implant such
a requirement would raise "serious constitutional problems, in
view of the absence of any definition of racketeering in the stat~ t e . As
" ~a ~racketeering
~
requirement might render the statute
vague and indefinite, such an interpretation, in the Court's view,
should be avoided. Preenactment materials were also consistent
with an interpretation that racketeering is not an essential element under the statute, which was aimed a t difficulties in earlier
legislation not relating to racketeering. Congress was careful to
define the covered criminal activity in detaik so that a congressional intent to include a term not defined in the statute as a
prerequisite to criminality was inconceivable to the Court.
The defendant asserted that ambiguities should be resolved
325.
326.
327.
328.

98 S. Ct. a t 2884.
435 U.S. 371 (1978).
18 U.S.C. 5 5 1951-1956 (1976).
435 U.S. a t 374.
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in favor of lenity, but the Court "decline[d] to manufacture
ambiguity where none exists."32gIt also was claimed that a problem in federal-state relations would arise unless racketeering were
made an element of the federal crime, but preenactment materials clearly showed that Congress had considered the matter directly and had concluded that there was no conflict in light of
state failure or inability to cope effectively with the problem at
which the federal statute was aimed.
County Board v. RichardsSS0sustained the power of local authorities to restrict street parking for the benefit of local residents. The Court found the parking control a reasonable encouragement to car pools and mass transit. A local legislature also
may decide that controlled flow of traffic into a neighborhood is
required to "enhance the quality of life there by reducing noise,
traffic hazards, and litter."331The Constitution does not ban such
objectives and does not presume that distinctions between residents and nonresidents are invidious. All that is necessary is that
an ordinance "rationally promote the regulation's objectives,"332
and this the Arlington County ordinance did.

The Court's fourth amendment decisions perhaps have
aroused the greatest controversy, particularly Zurcher and
Barlow S, Inc. Yet, after relatively calm analysis, there is nothing
strikingly new in the constitutional principles relied on. The same
can be said of the Court's treatment of protracted searches in
Mincey v. Arizona. In terms of the routine functioning of the
criminal justice system, perhaps Franks u. Delaware will engender the most litigation, in that it is difficult to believe that frequent attacks on search (and perhaps arrest) warrant affidavits
will not result, despite the Court's effort to limit its holding severely. If officers' safety can be endangered, the Court seems
ready to adopt a constitutional interpretation to protect them, as
the Mimms holding and Mincey asides illustrate. Finally,
Ceccolini suggests that a balancing test333governs in the application of exclusionary rules, a conclusion bolstered by the Court's
handling of the confessions aspect of Mincey. Hence, nothing in
Id. at 379.
434 U.S. 5 (1977).
Id. at 7.
Id.
In effect, the need for probative evidence is balanced against the need to deter
deliberate or reckless official misconduct.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
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the 1977-1978 Term signals a retreat from or additional major
modifications of the scope of evidentiary exclusionary rules.
In the sphere of judicial proceedings, only the administration
of the double jeopardy provision saw significant reevaluation by
the Court. Even there, the net impact is less a reworking of fundamental doctrine than it is a bit of architectural embellishment
here and some foundation repairs there. The Court manifested no
desire to let states experiment very far in local variations on a
federal theme, as Crist v. Bretz illustrated. Nor is the Court inclined to permit much balancing of harm to defendants against
harm to the system, judging from its rejection in Bretz of such
an approach as an alternative to an outright bar of retrial after
the cessation of original proceedings on grounds other than manifest necessity. On the whole, however, the Court's doctrinal position is no worse, and may well be better, than the ad hoc application of a due process standard.
The Court's handling of Federal Civil Rights Act remedies
reflects a somewhat similar mix to that found under the double
jeopardy doctrine: in certain respects citizens' ability to recover
under the law has been enhanced, but not at the expense of inordinate disruption of the justice system or massive revision of the
spheres of responsibility of the states and the federal government.
That the remainder of a somewhat reduced number of
criminal-law-related decisions (in comparison to the two or three
preceding Terms) bears on fairly narrow points perhaps confirms
a generalization which may be drawn from the entire body of
decisions during the Term: pragmatic response to specific problems generated by a functioning legal system is more acceptable
to a majority of the Justices than establishment of general principles of constitutional law to which specific decisions are made to
conform, however uncomfortably. Such an approach naturally
leaves many points to be resolved and inconsistencies to be eliminated when variant cases arise. On the whole, however, it cannot
be said that the Court's current disposition of constitutional issues generates more second-generation litigation than the sweeping approach of the Warren Court era; it may indeed promote a
more satisfactory administration of the justice machinery in the
long run.

